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Introduction
It is a general principle of law, whatever the community, that a legal
entity is responsible for the proximate injuries its acts may cause. The
principle is fundamental in the regulation of private entities, and juris-
prudence exhibits a clear trend toward the increasing subjection of gov-
ernments to this same rule of law.' In international law, the principle
has long been expressed and applied in the doctrine of "State responsi-
bility." There appears to be no cogent reason for suspending the opera-
tion of this policy with regard to acts of international organizations
(IOs).2
The very organization and raison d'tre of such entities would seem
to require its plenary application. Clyde Eagleton believed that the his-
torical "rules" of the international law of responsibility apply, perhaps
with some variations, to any subject of international law.3 As of 1950,
however, he observed that the Charter gave the United Nations little
authority under which it could cause harm to others.4 The Organiza-
tion had no army, navy, or military instruments through which to im-
* The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable comments and criticism of Myres
S. McDougal and W. Michael Reisman. Eisuke Suzuki read the manuscript and made
helpful comments.
The views here expressed are her own and are not necessarily representative of tose who
have helped her or of the United Nations.
t Legal Officer, Codification Division, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations.
1. U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1976);
State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33; European Convention on State Immunity, done May 16,
1972, Europ. T.S. No. 74 (1972).
2. This Article deals only with international organizations whose members are States,
with emphasis on the United Nations.
3. Eagleton, International Organization and the Law of Responsibility, 76 HAGUE
RECuEm 323, 325 (1950).
4. Id. at 386.
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pose its wishes and little trade activity, territory, or population to
protect. Hence he predicted that, at most, the Organization would in-
frequently undertake activities causing injuries.
While Eagleton's presumption of 10's responsibility proved correct,
his prediction that they would cause little injury was wrong, perhaps
because he compared 1Os with States and looked for similar sources of
responsibility. Some 10 activities may resemble those of States, but in
most cases the sources of responsibility of IOs are different. Francisco
V. Garcia-Amador, the first Special Rapporteur to the International
Law Commission (I.L.C.) on the subject of international responsibility,
had a much broader and more realistic concept of responsibility. From
observing the increased activities of 1Os, he believed that non-perform-
ance of obligations by such organization is like the breach or non-ob-
servance of any other international obligations and necessarily involves
responsib'ity.5
This Article contends that IOs, as both creations and creators of in-
ternational law, cannot ignore the principles that created them and that
they are designed to promote. IOs must be deemed incapable of ex-
cluding themselves arbitrarily from international obligations. Their ex-
ercise of power must conform to international law. It would be
illogical to assume that member States intended to create international
organizations with competence to transgress the obligations the States
themselves were assuming.6
The responsibility of IOs derives from community expectation about
their personality as subjects of international law, designed for specific
objectives, and provided with only such authority, resources, and bases
of power as are necessary to such objectives. Therefore, where 10 ac-
tivities in breach of international law result in injury, IOs are responsi-
ble for the injury like other subjects of international law. Any action
by IOs in contravention of the basic principles of responsibility can be
expected to draw complaints from States and others concerned with the
5. State Responsibility, 8 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/96 (1956), reprinted in [1956]
2 Y.B. NrT'L L. COMM'WN 173, 189-90, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add. I (report pre-
pared by Garca-Amador).
6. According to Professors McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen,
[t]he struggle to bring kings and presidents and other agencies within the confines of the
fundamental laws of national communities has left too indelible an impression upon
too many people to make plausible any supposition that the founders of the United
Nations intended to create, or have created, an organization free of its own basic
principles.
M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL, & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
332 (1980). The principles of the U.N. Charter and the obligations set out in its instruments
may be interpreted as applying to the organization itself and to its organs. I. BROWNLIE,




common interest. In determining responsibility, one must not, of
course, overlook the principal purposes and effective functioning of
IOs.
By the principle of implied assumption of obligations,7 the United
Nations and its affiliated organizations have been held subject to an
obligation to observe the purposes embodied in the United Nations
Charter. Article 1 of the Charter8 defines those purposes as including
"promotion and encouraging respect for human rights and for funda-
mental freedoms for all." The United Nations is "to be a centre for
harmonizing the actions of the nations in the attainment of these com-
mon ends." Article 1 also emphasizes "conformity with the principles
of justice and international law," and Article 29 refers to the principle
of "good faith." One criterion for testing the genuineness and effective-
ness of these principles is whether they are observed by IOs. It would
be fantastic to assume that United Nations officials and agencies are
authorized to violate the principles they were established to serve.
IOs themselves have recognized some responsibilities. Despite the
extraordinary expansion of international organization activity in the
past three decades, however, the responsibility of these organizations
for injurious violation of generally accepted obligations has yet to be
codified or systematically appraised. IOs now operate in regional as
well as global arenas. They do more things in more places than was
anticipated when they were created. They undertake political, social,
economic, environmental, and military operations. In many cases,
their legal personalities have been modified and, by option or need,
they occasionally operate on legal bases quite different from those orig-
inally conferred on them.
The International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) recognized early the po-
tential for development of IOs when it defined the legal personality of
the United Nations in the Reparations Case. Noting that the require-
ments of international life had created entities different from States, the
Court stated that the rights and duties of the United Nations must de-
pend on its "purposes and functions as specified or implied in its con-
stituent documents and developed in practice.'"1O
7. See Reparations Case, [1949] I.C.J. 174.
8. U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
9. U.N. CHART art. 2.
10. [1949] I.C.J. at 185. For further analysis of the international personality of lOs, see
H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 329-30 (1950); L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 381-84, 420-22 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1967); G. WEISSBERG, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL STATUS OF THE UNrrED NATIONS 12-13, 23 (1961); Eagleton, supra note 3; Hahn,
EURA4TOM. The Conception of an International Personality, 71 HAv. L. REv. 1001, 1045-
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The changing authority and activities of IOs may pose difficult ques-
tions of responsibility because they increase the possibility of injury or
grievance. As members of the international community, IOs have both
rights and obligations. In the Reparations Case, the I.C.J. emphasized
that the United Nations is a subject of international law capable of
"possessing international rights and duties."'11 Because IOs are created
to promote public order, it would be perverse, even destructive, to pos-
tulate a community expectation that IOs need not conform to the prin-
ciples of public order. This Article examines the scope of the claims
against 1Os and analyzes expectations in the present international order
about the responsibility of these organizations. Though this Article pri-
marily focuses on the United Nations, a comparable theory and analy-
sis apply to other IOs.
Once it is determined that 1Os have some measure of responsibility,
it becomes necessary to inquire into the degree of that responsibility.
The doctrine of "State responsibility" seeks to balance the interests of
the larger community in the secure and economic maintenance of a
global society and economy with the adequate protection by each State
of its own internal social processes. In the context of IOs, the corre-
sponding task calls for accommodating the larger community's interest
46 (1958); Penfield, The Legal Status of the Pan American Union, 20 AM. J. INT'L L. 257
(1926); Sloan, Reparation for Injury to Agents of the United Nations, 28 NEa. L. REV. 401
(1949); Williams, The Legal Character of the Bankfor International Settlements, 24 A. J.
INT'L L. 665 (1930).
See also D. BowrT, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (3rd ed. 1975); F.
SEYERSTED, OBJECTIVE INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANI-
ZATIONS (1963); Jenks, The Legal Personality of International Organizations, 22 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 267 (1945); Yuen-Li Liang, The Legal Status of the United Nations in the United
States, 2 INTL L.Q. 577 (1948-49); Seidl-Hohenveldern, The Legal Personality of Interna-
tional and Supranational Organizations, 21 REVUE EGYPTIENNE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
35 (1965).
Sometimes later bilateral or multilateral agreements have recognized or modified the legal
personality of IOs. E.g., Interim Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations, June 11, 1946, United Nations-Switzerland, I U.N.T.S. 163; Agreement on Legal
Status of the World Health Organization, July 17, 1948, World Health Organization-Swit-
zerland, 26 U.N.T.S. 331; Agreement on Legal Status of the World Meterological Organiza-
tion, Mar. 10, 1955, World Meterological Organization-Switzerland, 211 U.N.T.S. 277;
Agreement on Legal Status, June 11, 1955, European Organization for Nuclear Research-
Switzerland, 249 U.N.T.S. 405.
The title of the Interim Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Na-
tions was amended by an additional agreement between the Secretary-General of the United
Nations and the Swiss Federal Council, so that the title has become "Agreement on the
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations." [19631 U.N. JURIDICAL Y.B. 43.
The agreement establishing the African Development Bank provides that "the Bank shall
possess full international personality" and "may enter into agreements with members, non-
member States and other international organizations." Agreement Establishing the African
Development Bank, Aug. 4, 1963, art. 50, 510 U.N.T.S. 3, 100.
11. [1949] I.C.J at 178-79.
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International Organizations
in the effective and economic functioning of IOs for the purposes for
which they were created with the interests of victims of 10 activities.
Of course, the policies at stake will differ with the injured parties and
the types of injury.
I. Potential Claimants
10 operations require contact at many levels with diverse parties
who may be injured by 10 activities. Parties may include dependent
peoples, governments, other IOs, individuals, and employees.
A. Dependent Peoples
This category of claimants is particularly relevant to the U.N., for the
U.N. may acquire direct or indirect supervision over dependent peo-
ples. For example, the United Nations Temporary Executive Author-
ity (U.N.T.E.A.) administered the territory of West New Guinea (West
Irian) from August 15, 1962 until May 1, 1963, when the U.N. trans-
ferred "full administration responsibility" to Indonesia. 12 After the
U.N. terminated the Mandate of South Africa over South West Africa
(Namibia),13 it established the Council for Namibia in 1967 as the ad-
ministering authority of Namibia. 14 Since then the Council has been
acting on behalf of the people of Namibia, primarily representing them
in international meetings and concluding bilateral agreements with cer-
tain countries concerning identification papers for Namibians.1 5 Yet
the exact authority of the Council for Namibia is unclear. If the activi-
ties of the Council cause injuries to the future State of Namibia, other
States, or non-State entities, the Council might become a defendant in
a proceeding to recover damages resulting from its alleged unlawful
acts.
B. Governments
IOs undertake activities within the territorial jurisdiction of States.
In addition to convening conferences and establishing headquarters
and premises, IOs may assist governments in health and development
12. See Agreement Concerning West New Guinea (West Irian), Aug. 15, 1962, Indone-
sia-Netherlands, 437 U.N.T.S. 273. The General Assembly took note of the agreement and
authorized the Secretary-General to carry out the tasks therein entrusted to him. G.A. Res.
1752, 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 70, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).
13. G.A. Res. 2145, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 2, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
14. G.A. Res. 2248 (S-V), Fifth Special Session, Supp. (No. 1), U.N. Doc. A/L.516/
Rev.1 (1967). See Herman, "he LegalStatus f Namibia andthe United Nations Councilfor
Namibia, 13 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 306 (1975).
15. [1967] U.N. JuRmIcAL Y.B. 309.
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programs, help refugees, lend money (in the case of regional or interna-
tional banks), and undertake military activities (as peace observers or
peace-keeping forces). These activities sometimes cause injuries to
governments because of alleged wrongdoing attributable to IOs.
Some IOs may also become parties to international conventions. In
such circumstances, States may bring claims' against IOs for violation
of those conventions. For example, in the 1978 Geneva session of the
Law of the Sea Conference, a proposal was put forward for the Euro-
pean Economic Community (E.E.C.) to become party to the future
Convention of the Law of the Sea as a legal entity separate from its
members.16
C. Private Parties
By private parties, we refer to individuals and private corporate enti-
ties that are not 10 employees. Though, historically, it was assumed
that the work of IOs was related to interstate affairs, individuals and
private entities increasingly seem to be affected by 10 operations. IOs
buy, sell, and lease movable and immovable property; acquire copy-
rights and patents; grant and obtain loans; engage firms and individual
contractors to perform services; conclude contracts for insurance and
public utility services; receive donations, and the like.17
D. Employees
1Os generally have staff numbering hundreds or thousands of em-
ployees. Numerically, this group may be the largest category of claim-
ants. Their claims may include administrative matters (e.g.,
promotion, contractual obligations, acquired rights, and pension bene-
fits) as well as torts.
II. Types of Claims
The types of claims that may be made against 1Os are almost as va-
ried as the category of potential claimants. Though presently most
claims against IOs are for breach of contract or for torts, there is poten-
tial for claims regarding non-performance of international treaty obli-
gations, ultra vires acts, or labor relations.
16. U.N. Press Release SEA/310 (May 16, 1978). The proposal is still under negotia-
tion. See U.N. Doe. A/CONF.62/L.86 (1982).
17. E.g., The European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) had about 190 re-
search contracts and about 200 purchase and construction contracts in 1967. Seyersted, Ap-
plicable Law in Relations between Intergovernmental Organizations and Private Parties, 122




IOs undertake contractual obligations for construction, transporta-
tion, research studies, lease and purchase of movable and immovable
property, etc. There seems to be almost no difference in the processes
of commitment, performance, and change between contracts made by
IOs with private parties and those made by private parties or by private
parties with States. The only difference is procedural: IOs often enjoy
extensive immunities from national jurisdiction. This difference does
not go to substantive responsibility. Indeed law and practice in relation
to contracts made by 1Os appears more settled than that in relation to
agreements made by States. The majority of IOs seem satisfied with
the present situation.18
One difference between 10 contracts and those of private parties re-
lates to contracts for the sites of IOs. 19 In most cases, those contracts
are between the organization concerned and the host government. Site
contracts are not related to the principal objectives of IOs, but they are
indispensable to the establishment and physical set-up of the organiza-
tions. Hence, these contracts give some special treatment to IOs.
Though there have been no disputes, it is expected that decision-mak-
ers would consider the special status of IOs and, as a matter of policy,
would avoid disrupting the international functions of IOs.
Contracts between IOs enjoying extensive immunities and private
parties generally contain clauses referrigg to the immunities. Such
clauses obviously have no counterpart in similar contracts between pri-
vate parties. In U.N. contracts, for example, there are two separate
clauses regarding U.N. immunities and the non-liability of its Mem-
bers. They emphasize U.N. immunity from the jurisdiction of local
courts and seek to protect U.N. civil servants from liability arising from
the contracts.20 Where private contractors undertake technical opera-
18. See [1976] U.N. JuRIcAL Y.B. 159, 176. See also Valticos, Les contrats concluspar
les organisations internatlonales avec des personnes priv~es, 57 (1) ANNUAIRE, INSTITUT DE
DROrr INTERNATIONAL 1 (1977); Cinqutames&nceplenilre, 57 (11) ANNUAIRE, INSTITUT DE
DRorr INTERNATIONAL 264-78 (1977).
19. Agreement on Ariana Site, June 11, 1946, United Nations-Switzerland, 1 U.N.T.S.
153. For the New York laws pertaining to the site of the United Nations Headquarters,
consult N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS §§ 9608-9610 (McKinney 1974). See also Bota, The Capac-
ity of International Organizations to Conclude Headquarters Agreements, and some Features
of these Agreements, in AGREEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE VI-
ENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (K. Zemanek ed. 1971).
20. For example, an unpublished agreement (on ifie with the U.N. Legal Department)
between the United Nations and a private contractor for construction of the headquarters of
the Economic and Social Commission for Asia (E.S.C.A.P.) in Thailand provides:
Nothing contained in the Contract shall be deemed a waiver, express or implied, of
any privilege or immunity which the United Nations may enjoy according to law,
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tions on behalf of IOs such as the World Health Organization
(W.H.O.), the service contracts typically grant immunity to the private
contractors. Disputes are to be settled with the IOs themselves, either
as provided in the contracts, as agreed between the parties, or accord-
ing to precedent.
1Os may also make commitments to indiiduals as part of their prin-
cipal functions. The main objective of regional development banks, for
example, is social and economic development of member countries.21
One function of regional banks is to make loans to member States or
their citizens for development projects. 22 Where loan contracts lead to
disputes with private parties, 3 such disputes would arise from contracts
related to the principal objectives of the banks.
B. Torts
Claims regarding damages caused by torts attributable to IOs are nu-
merous. The concept of 10 tort responsibility has been recognized by
the organizations, by judicial decisions, and by past practice. In rela-
whether pursuant to the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Na-
tions as adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 13 February 1946,
or to any regulation of the United Nations and any other resolution, order or decree of
any of the organs of the United Nations or to the Agreement between the United Na-
tions and the Government of Thailand Relating to the Head-Quarters of the Economic
Commission for Asia and the Far East in Thailand on 26 May 1954 or any other law,
order or decree of the Government of Thailand or of any other country or otherwise,
existing at the present time or hereafter brought into force.
Neither the Members of the United Nations nor any officer, agent or employee
thereof shall be charged personally by the Contractor for any liability, or held liable to
him under any term or provision of the Contract, or because of its execution or because
of any breach thereof.
In addition to the United Nations, the Organization of American States (O.A.S.) and other
1Os have been subject to private claims. See, e.g., Dupree Assoc. v. O.A.S., No. 76-2335
(D.D.C., June 1 and June 22, 1977) (memorandum orders); Broadbent v. O.A.S., 628 F.2d 27
(D.C. Cir. 1980).
21. The objectives are either stipulated in the constitutions of the regional development
banks or are enunciated by their officials. See, e.g., F. HERRERA, THE INTER-AMERICAN
BANK 31-34 (1962) (views of Felipe Herrera, President of the Inter-American Development
Bank).
22. See, eg., Agreement Establishing the Inter-American Development Bank, opened/or
signature Apr. 8, 1959, art. I, § 2, 10 U.S.T. 3029, T.I.A.S. No. 4397, 389 U.N.T.S. 69.
23. For an examination of the legal questions concerning loan agreements, see G. DE-
LAUME, AsPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LENDING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FINANCING79 (1967); Delaume, The Proper Law of Loans Concluded by International Persons: A Re-
statement anda Forecast, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 63 (1962); J. SALMON, LE R6LE DES ORGANISA-
TIONS INTERNATIONALES EN MATIPRE DE PRrTS ET D'EMPRUNTS 223-37 (1958); Salmon, Les
contrats de la BIRD, 2 ANNUAIRE FRANIAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 635 (1956); Broches,
International LegalAspects of the Operations of the World Bank, 98 HAGUE RECUEIL 301
(1959); Seyersted, supra note 17, at 504-20; Sereni, International Economic Institutions and
the Munic#7al Law of States, 96 HAGuE RECUEm 133 (1959); Cutler, The Inter-American
Development Bank, 16 Bus. LAW. 22 (1960).
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tion to contracts made by IOs, particularly those with extensive immu-
nities, some judicial method of dispute settlement is commonly
provided. The mere availability to the claimant of a judicial process
makes some difference in the atmosphere of settling the claim and may
be an incentive to settle by negotiation.
Tort liability generally arises unexpectedly. 10 activities leading to
tort claims may occur during the normal course of operations or during
crisis situations. Except where an 1O enters into a long-term operation
in which torts can be anticipated, no methods of dispute settlement
generally exist. The absence of established and assured judicial fora
distinguishes torts attributable to 1Os from those attributable to private
parties.
1. In Ordinary Operations
One cannot predict when a tort will occur, but one can predict that
certain activities are likely to give rise to torts. The constituent instru-
ments of some IOs recognize tort responsibility.24 When IOs undertake
special operations in the territory of States, responsibility for liability
deriving from those operations is generally determined by special
agreements between IOs and host countries. In principle, IOs are re-
sponsible for damages caused by their illegal acts.25 There are excep-
24. The treaties establishing the European Atomic Energy Community and the E.E.C.
provide that "[als regards non-contractual liability, the Community shall, in accordance
with the general principles common to the laws of Member States, make reparation for any
damage caused by its institutions or by its employees in the performance of their duties."
Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), done Mar. 25,
1957, art. 188, 298 U.N.T.S. 169; Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community
(E.E.C.), Mar. 25, 1957, art. 215, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Rome].
A year after the establishment of the U.N., the General Assembly recognized the fre-
quency of motor accidents and the responsibility of the U.N.:
It is the intention of the United Nations to prevent the occurrence of any abuse in
connection with privileges, immunities and facilities granted to it under Articles 104
and 105 of the Charter and the General Convention on Privileges and Immunities,
which determines the details of the application of these Articles.
Therefore the General Assembly instructs the Secretary-General to ensure that the
drivers of all official motor cars of the United Nations and all members of the staff, who
own or drive motor cars, shall be properly insured against third party risks.
G.A. Res. XIII 6(E), 1 U.N. GAOR, pt. 1, at 644 (1946).
Following this policy statement, motor vehicles owned by the U.N. have been insured
against third-party liability. See also C. CROSWELL, PROTECTION OF INTERNATIONAL PER-
SONNEL ABROAD 24-25, 55-57 (1952). Carrying such third-party liability, however, does not
mean that the U.N. has waived immunities. The U.N. does not generally have insurance
against third-party liability. See [1975] U.N. JURIDICAL Y.B. 160-61. The-waiver of immu-
nity will depend on the organization's decision in every case.
25. Eagleton, supra note 3, at 319; Garcia-Amador, La responsabilib internationale de
l'Etat: La responsabilit des organirations internationales, 34 REvuE DE DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL, DE SCIENCES DIPLOMATIQUES ET PoLrrIQUEs 149 (1956); Visscher, Observation Sur le
fondement et la mise en oeuvre dupince de la responsabilitb de l'Organisation des Nations
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tions. In some instances, States in whose territory operations are
conducted will be responsible for claims lodged against the IOs. 26 JOs
may assume responsibility, however, for gross negligence or willful
misconduct.27 With respect to third party injury, JOs may disclaim re-
sponsibility for the recommendations and reports prepared by their ex-
perts, unless the JOs revise and adopt the recommendations and reports
as their own.28
2. In armed conflicts
Until now, relatively few JOs have been involved in armed conflicts.
The U.N. has been involved in conflicts in Greece (1947), Kashmir
(1948), Palestine (1948), Lebanon (1958), West New Guinea (1962-63),
Yemen (1963-64), Suez (1956-57), the Congo (1960-64), Cyprus (since
Unier, 40 REvUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE DROIT COMPARA 165 (1963); Ritter, La
protection diplomatique & l'garddiune organisation internationale, 8 ANNuAiRE FrIANA lS DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 427, 441 (1962); Salmon, Les accords Spaak-U Thant du 20ftvrier
1965, 11 ANN AiRE FRANqAIS DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL 468, 477 (1965).
26. For example, Article 1(6) of the Agreement of May 21, 1968 between Australia, on
the one hand, and the U.N., the World Health Organization (W.H.O.), the International
Labour Organization (I.L.O.), the Food and Agricultural Organization (F.A.O.), UNESCO,
the International Civil Aviation Organization (1.C.A.O.), the International Telecommunica-
tions Union (I.T.U.), the World Meterological Organization (W.M.O.), the International
Atomic Energy Agency (I.A.E.A.), the Universal Postal Union (U.P.U.), the Intergovern-
mental Maritime Consultative Organization (I.M.C.O.), and the United Nations Industrial
Development Organization (U.N.I.D.O.), on the other, provides for technical assistance to
the Territory of Papua and the Trust Territory of New Guinea.
The Government shall be responsible for dealing with any claims resulting from opera-
tions in the Territories under this Agreement which may be brought by third parties
against the Organizations jointly or separately and their experts, agents and employees
and shall hold harmless the Organizations and their experts, agents and employees in
case of any claims or liabilities resulting from such operations, except where it is agreed
by the Government and the Administrator of the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme and the Organization concerned that such claims or liabilities arise from the
gross negligence or wilful misconduct of such experts, agents or employees.
[1968] U.N. JURIDICAL Y.B. 44. Article VI, para. 1 of UNICEF's Model Agreement pro-
vides: "The Government [in whose territory a plan is executed] shall assume, subject to the
provisions of this Article, responsibility in respect of claims resulting from the execution of
Plan of Operations within the territory. .. ." UNICEF Field Manual, vol. II, pt. IV-2,
Appendix A (Aug. 16, 1961). A similar provision is found in the Technical Assistance
Board/Special Fund Field Manual, Section DI/l, a(i) (Feb., 1963).
27. Article VIII, para. (f) of the Model Agreement concerning assistance for the Special
Fund disclaims responsibility, except where "it is agreed by the Parties hereto, and the Exec-
utive Agency, that such claims or liabilities arise from the gross negligence or willful miscon-
duct of such persons." Technical Assistance Board/Special Fund Field Manual, section
D1/1 a(ii) (Feb., 1963).
28. Disclaimers may appear in U.N. publications relevant to policy analysis, as well as
technical matters, prepared by outside consultants. See, e.g., An International Law Analysis
of the Major United Nations Resolutions Concerning the Palestinian Question, U.N. Doe.
ST/SG/SER.F/4 (1979) (paper prepared by two outside consultants). A note at the front of
the document reads: 'This study was prepared and published at the request of the Commit-
tee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. The views expressed
are those of the authors."
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1964), and Lebanon (since 1978). Two other IOs also have participated
in armed conflicts. The Organization of American States (O.A.S.) in-
troduced an "Inter-American Armed Forces" into the Dominican Re-
public in 1965; its competence to create such forces has been the subject
of controversy. 29 There seems to be no record of claims against the
O.A.S. arising from this operation. The League of Arab States inter-
posed disengagement forces in Kuwait (1961), in Yemen (1962), in the
North and South Yemen conflict (1972), and in Lebanon (since 1978).30
In Kuwait's case, there was a U.N.-type status of forces agreement that
provided procedures for dispute settlement.31 There seems to be no
record of claims against the League for its operations.
Because of the unavailability of information, only U.N. peace-keep-
ing operations can be examined. These operations32 were mounted
with little or no prediction of their eventual scope and the liability aris-
ing from them. The inherent unpredictability of such operations
should not and has not minimized 10 responsibility for unjustifiable
injury to States and individuals.
Though framed in general and vague provisions, some responsibili-
ties have been recognized in bilateral agreements between the U.N. and
States. For example, the agreement relating to the legal status, facili-
ties; privileges, and immunities of the United Nations Operations in the
Congo (O.N.U.C.) provided for U.N. settlement of disputes involving
loss or damage to citizens or residents of the Congo caused by the U.N.
Force or by U.N. officials. 33 Three years later, the 1964 agreement with
29. See Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394,
T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, Additional Protocol, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607,
T.I.A.S. No. 6847, 721 U.N.T.S. 324; Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept.
2,1947, 62 Stat. 1681, T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21 U.N.T.S. 77; L. SOHN, CASES ON UNITED NA-
TIONS LAW 1025-72 (2d ed. 1967); Connell-Smith, The 0-4.S. and the Dominican Crsis, 21
THE WORLD TODAY 229 (1965); Fenwick, The Dominican Republic: Intervention or Collec-
tive Se/f-Defense, 60 AM. 3. IN'L L. 64 (1966).
For a discussion ofadhoc international forces, see D. BowEr, UNITED NA-fIONS FORCES
5-11 (1964).
30. Pact of League of Arab States, Mar. 22, 1945, art. 6, 70 U.N.T.S. 238. For a brief
study of the Arab League military operations, see H. HASSOuNA, THE LEAGUE OF ARAB
STATES AND REGIONAL DISPUTES 379-82 (1975).
31. H. HAsSOUNA, supra note 30, at 447.
32. For an analysis of the concept of peace-keeping and a review of U.N. policies, see D.
WAINHOUSE, INTERNATIONAL PEACE-KEEPING AT THE CROSSROADS 1-10 (1973); Auma-
Osolo, U.N. Peace-keeping Policy, 6 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 323-59 (1976); Auma-Osolo, Retro-
spective Analysis of U.. Activity in Congo and its Sign~icance for Contemporary Africa, 8
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 451-74 (1975); Dai, Canada and the Review of U.N. Peace-keeping
Operations, 12 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 186-210 (1974).
33. Under the terms of the agreement,
[i]f as a result of any act performed by a member of the Force or an official in the course
of his official duties, it is alleged that loss or damage that may give rise to civil proceed-
ings has been caused to a citizen or resident of the Congo, the United Nations shall
settle the dispute by negotiation or any other method agreed between the Parties; if it is
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Cyprus regarding the U.N. peace-keeping forces in Cyprus stipulated
that claims by Cypriot citizens or by the Cypriot government against
the U.N. Force, and claims by the Force or the government against
each other, would be settled by a claims commission.34 An identical
provision appears in the 1957 agreement between the U.N. and Egypt
regarding the U.N. Emergency Force in that country.35 The U.N.
agreement with Lebanon concerning the U.N. Emergency Force
there3 6 is phrased slightly differently. Its effects are unclear. It pro-
vides that "civil claims or disputes involving a member of the Force
acting in the course of his official duty shall be settled in accordance
with the provisions of Article VIII of the Convention on the Privileges
and Immunities of the United Nations." Yet Article VIII only says that
the U.N. should provide some procedure for dispute settlement, with
no reference to specific methods. Though other peace-keeping opera-
tions have not provided for resolution of claims, it is possible to infer
from these four agreements a general policy for determining liability
for U.N. operations.
Peace-keeping operations are complex not only in terms of the poli-
tics involved, but also in terms of the legal relationships that develop
among different nationals in different territorial jurisdictions for differ-
ent matters. Claims arising from peace-keeping operations involve
contractual obligations as well as torts, criminal acts, and damages dur-
ing hostilities.
Perhaps the largest number of claims against the U.N. derived from
the Congo operation,3 7 which extended far beyond the expectation of
not found possible to arrive at an agreement in this manner, the matter shall be submit-
ted to arbitration at the request of either Party.
Agreement on Legal Status, Facilities, Privileges and Immunities of United Nations Opera-
tions in the Congo, Nov. 27, 1961, United Nations-Congo, para. 10(b), 414 U.N.T.S. 229,
235. The same procedure is provided for settlement of civil disputes not related to official
duties. Id., para. 10(c).
34. This agreement provides that:
Any claims made by
(i) a Cypriot citizen in -respect of any damages alleged to result from an act or
omission of a member of the Force relating to his official duties;
(ii) the Government against a member of the Force; or
(iii) the Force or the Government against one another,
that is not covered by paragraphs 39 or 40 of these arrangements, shall be settled by a
Claims Commission established for that purpose,
Exchange of Letters Concerning the Status of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in
Cyprus, Mar. 31, 1964, United Nations-Cyprus, para. 38(b), 492 U.N.T.S. 57, 78.
35. Exchange of Letters on Status of U.N. Emergency Force in Egypt, Feb. 8, 1957,
United Nations-Egypt, art. 38, 260 U.N.T.S. 61, 82.
36. Exchange of Letters Concerning U.N. Emergency Force Leave Center in Lebanon,
Apr. 20-May 1, 1957, United Nations-Lebanon, 266 U.N.T.S. 125.





its initiators. The Congo was, in fact, the first instance in which the
U.N. faced the possibility of substantial liability. The majority of the
Congo claims were of the so-called "hostility" variety: injuries caused
by firing, bombing, irregular requisitioning, and looting. Indeed, to
date, most hostility claims against the U.N. derive from the Congo op-
eration. Because of its unique character, the Congo experience need
not be regarded as definitive precedent, determining future expecta-
tions; yet U.N. reactions to Congo claims have influenced behavior in
subsequent peace-keeping operations.
Some injury is bound to occur to the U.N., other entities, or individ-
uals during hostilities. The likelihood of injury increases with the ur-
gency of implementing the mission and the extent to which active
measures of self-defense are required. Categorical rejection of liability
for injury seems unacceptable, but the circumstances under which in-
jury occurs may determine the degree of the tortfeasor's responsibility
and, in some cases, may erase wrongfulness or liability.
By establishing a procedure for the settlement of disputes between
the U.N. and nationals of the State where the U.N. force operates, the
U.N. appears to have accepted that it, and not the government of that
State, is to be liable for injuries resulting from wrongful actions by the
peace-keeping forces. This presumption is reinforced by the facts of
administrative control. Though the U.N. forces in the Congo were re-
quested by the Congolese government, the forces were under exclusive
U.N. control.38 Acts of the force were thus attributed to the U.N. and
not to the host government.39
In a letter concluding several post-Congo "global settlement agree-
ments"'4 with States receiving lump-sum compensation for damages
38. As the Secretary-General put it in his 1960 Report to the Security Council, "[the
Force is necessarily under the exclusive command of the United Nations, vested in the Sec-
retary-General under the control of the Security Council." First report of the Secretary-
General on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 143, 15 U.N. SCOR, Supp.
(July-Sept. 1960) 16, 18, U.N. Doc. S/4389 (1960).
39. In this regard, art. 13 of the Report of the International Law Commission on State
Responsibility stipulates:
The conduct of an organ of an international organization acting in that capacity shall
not be considered as an act of State under international law by reason only of the fact
that such conduct has taken place in the territory of that State or in any other territory
under its jurisdiction.
Report of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 10) 38, U.N. Doc. A/10010/
Rev.1 (1975). See also Commentary to art. 13, id., at 40-41.
40. The letter from U Thant to P.H. Spaak (Belgian Foreign Minister) dated July 5,
1964, is quoted by Salmon, supra note 25, at 479. The following global settlement agree-
ments were concluded: Exchange of Letters Settling Financial Questions as Regards For-
mer Belgian Military Bases in Congo, Feb. 20, 1965, United Nations-Belgium, 535 U.N.T.S.
191; Exchange of Letters Relating to Settlement of Claims Filed by Swiss Nationals, June 3,
1966, United Nations-Switzerland, 564 U.N.T.S. 193; Exchange of Letters Relating to Settle-
ment of Claims Filed by Greek Nationals, June 20, 1966, United Nations-Greece, 565
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caused to their nationals by U.N. forces, the Secretary-General con-
ceded U.N. responsibility for reparation of injury caused by the wrong-
ful acts of its agents. The Soviet representative objected to one such
agreement concluded with the Belgian government on the ground that
Belgium was the colonial power in the Congo and deserved no com-
pensation. The Secretary-General replied:
It has always been the policy of the United Nations, acting through the
Secretary-General, to compensate individuals who have suffered damages
for which the Organization was legally liable. Thispolicy is in keeping with
generaly recognized legal principles and with the Convention on Privileges
and Immunities of the United Nations. In addition, in regard to the
United Nations activities in the Congo, it is reinforced by the principles
set forth in the international conventions concerning the protection of the
life and property of civilian populations during hostilities as well as by
considerations of equity and humanity which the United Nations cannot
ignore.41
In 1964, in a letter addressed to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs, the Secretary-General characterized U.N. responsibility for repa-
ration for wrongful injuries as "responsabilit morale." The word
"morale" seems to have been intended to minimize U.N. legal responsi-
bility. Such a characterization would appear incompatible with the
principles and purposes of the Charter. From a policy standpoint, at-
tempts to minimize the reasonable responsibility of the U.N., while it is
expanding and strengthening its activities in -international relations,
could have a devastating impact on its competence. In its context, the
word "morale" seems to have been chosen almost reflexively, as a law-
yer's device for protecting his client.
The behavior of the U.N. indicates more than a moral responsibility;
it is closer to an obligation. In a letter addressed to the President of the
Red Cross, the Secretary-General stated: "I also wish to confirm that
the United Nations insists on its armed forces in the field applying the
principles of the Conventions as scrupulously as possible. ' 42 The con-
ventions referred to in the letter were the 1949 Geneva Conventions
concerning respect for human rights in armed conflictS. 43 Indeed, the
U.N.T.S. 3; Exchange of Letters Relating to Settlement of Claims Filed by Luxembourg
Nationals, Dec. 28, 1966, United Nations-Luxembourg, 585 U.N.T.S. 147; Exchange of Let-
ters Relating to Claims by Italian Nationals, Jan. 18, 1967, United Nations-Italy, 588
U.N.T.S. 197.
41. [1967] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 220; [1965] U.N. JURIDICAL Y.B. 41 (emphasis
added).
42. 1962 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 29.
43. Geneva Convention for Amelioration of Condition of Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in Field, done Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Ge-
neva Convention for Amelioration of Condition of Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Mem-
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regulations governing the U.N. Forces in Congo provide that "[t]he
forces shall observe the principles and spirit of the general international
conventions applicable to the conduct of military personnel." 44 Jean
Salmon concluded that this Article referred to the applicability of the
laws of war to the U.N. operation.45 If this conjecture of the intent of
the regulation is too broad, it is correct in principle. Though the U.N.
is not a party to the Red Cross Conventions or to its 1977 additional
protocols, it abides by their principles when involved in "hostility."
These principles include minimum requirements for protection of life,
safety, and property and remedies if those minimum standards are
violated.
The U.N. has persistently denied responsibility for injuries during
hostilities that are not attributable to illegal activities of its agents. The
organization makes its own decision about what constitutes injury re-
sulting from hostilities and military necessity, presumably taking into
account whether its forces have observed a reasonable standard of care.
Should a future claimant disagree with a U.N. decision, the U.N.
would probably refuse to submit the case to judicial process and would
resolve the dispute through negotiations with the claimant and its State.
Injuries during hostilities arising from breach of contract, however,
are treated differently. Most of them are settled by arbitration. For
example, in 1961 the U.N. contracted with Sabena for the charter of
several aircraft, to be operated by Sabena or any of its subcontractors,
on U.N.-directed flights in connection with the U.N. mission in the
Congo. Among the aircraft provided by Sabena was one belonging to,
and operated by Starways Limited, a subcontractor. During an attack
by Katangan forces hostile to the U.N., the Starways aircraft was de-
stroyed. In subsequent negotiations, the U.N. agreed to arbitrate the
dispute with the liquidator of Starways' successor, British Eagle (Liver-
bers of Armed Forces at Sea, done Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75
U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention on Treatment of Prisoners of War, done Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364,75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention on Protection of Civil-
ian Persons in Time of War, done Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75
U.N.T.S. 287, Additional Protocol, 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1391 (1977). The U.N. is
not a party to these conventions.
See generally D. BownTr, supra note 29, at 222; F. SEYERSTED, UNITED NATIONS FORCES
IN THE LAW OF PEACE AND WAR (1966); Draper, The Legal Limitations upon the Employ-
ment of Weapons by the United Natons Forces in the Congo, 12 INT'L CoMP. L.Q. 387 (1963);
Salmon, supra note 25; Wijewardane, Crminal Jurisdiction over Visiting Forces, 41 Bnrr.
Y.B. INT'L L. 179 (1968).
44. Draper, supra note 43, at 394.
45. Salmon, supra note 25, at 480.
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pool) Limited. The parties reached a settlement before arbitration.46
The innovation here was the U.N.'s agreement to let an arbitrator de-
cide the question of whether the U.N. had breached a duty of care con-
cerning the safety of the aircraft. In other claims, the U.N. had not
allowed this fundamental question to be raised.
Based on official policies stated in documents and agreements, the
U.N. accepts responsibility only for reparation for death and injuries to
its "Military Observers" while on U.N. duty.47 Voluntarily and with-
out accepting formal responsibility, it has also acceded to claims of
members of its peace-keeping operations to pay compensation for
death or serious injury suffered during official duties. By the terms of
the agreements for peace-keeping forces, the States contributing to the
operations, and not the U.N., are responsible for compensating their
nationals.48 In practice, however, the U.N. has reimbursed States for
pensions payable to their nationals. This operational policy was set
forth by the Secretary-General in his Report on the Financing of the
United Nations Emergency Forces and the U.N. Disengagement Ob-
server Force of 1974.
Death and disability awards to or in respect of members of [peace-keep-
ing] contingents are not covered by or included within the above formulae
[regarding the reimbursement of governments that have contributed
troops to the peace-keeping forces]. The Secretary-General has continued
the practice whereby a troop contributor makes subpayments to benefi-
ciaries as are prescribed under the national legislation of its country and
reimbursement is then claimed from the United Nations for such
amounts.49
46. [1969] U.N. JURIDICAL Y.B. 233-34. See also Harpignies, Settlement o/Disputes of a
Private Law Character, 7 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 451 (1971).
47. Compensation is either $20,000 or twice the annual salary, whichever is greater. See
Field Administration Handbook, U.N. Doc. ST/OGS/L.2/Rev.3, at F-28 -30 (1975). Com-
pensation paid under these rules is the only compensation payable by the United Nations in
the case of death, injury, or illness. Id., at F-29, para. l(d).
48. The regulations governing the United Nations Peace-Keeping Forces in Cyprus, for
example, state:
Service-incurred death, injury, or illness. In the event of death, injury or illness of a
member of the Force attributable to service with the Force, the respective State from
whose military services the member has come will be responsible for such benefits or
compensation awards as may be payable under the laws and regulations applicable to
service in the armed forces of that State. The Commander shall have responsibility for
arrangements concerning the body and personal property of a deceased member of the
Force.
U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/UNFICYP/I (1964). This paragraph reappears in all formal agree-
ments for peace-keeping operations.
49. Financing of the U.N. Emergency Force, Report of the Secretary-General, 29 U.N.
GAOR, (Agenda Item 84) 6, U.N. Doc. A/9822 (1974) (emphasis added).
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The U.N. thus has accepted wider responsibility for payment of dam-
ages to its peace-keeping forces than was originally expected.
C. Failure to protect the interests of its agents
In recent years U.N. employees have been increasingly subjects of
arbitrary arrest, detainment, or imprisonment in various parts of the
world.50 Is the U.N. responsible for failing to bring a claim on behalf
of an agent injured in the course of duty by the illegal act of a State or
State agent in the territorial jurisdiction of that State? Consider a hy-
pothetical case involving X, a U.N. staff member stationed in country
Y, who is seriously injured by the illegal act of Government Y. Gov-
ernment Y presents no legal justification for its act, nor does it attempt
to compensate X. Is the U.N. obligated to bring a formal claim against
Y in accord with principles and procedures expressed by the I.C.J. in
the Reparations Case51 and later embodied in General Assembly Reso-
lution 365 (IV) of 1949?52 That resolution provides that the Secretary-
General is authorized to bring international claims on behalf of injured
staff members against the government of a State that is alleged to be
responsible for the injury. The Secretary-General is authorized to ne-
gotiate with that State to settle the dispute. Failing'agreement, the mat-
ter may be referred to arbitration.
The issue here is whether the U.N. is under an obligation to bring
international claims on behalf of its injured staff or instead has discre-
50. See U.N. OBSERVER AND INT'L REP., Nov. 3, 1979, at 3; DIPLOMATIC WORLD BULL.,
Feb. 17, 1979, at 3, 10; N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1979, at 10, col. 3; id., Oct. 30, 1979, at 12, col. 1.
See also Yu-Long Ling, A Comparative Study of the Privileges and Immunities of United
Nations Member Representatives and Officials with the Traditional Privileges and Immunities
of Doplomatic Agents, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 91, 134-37 (1976).
51. Reparations Case, [1949] I.C.J. 174.
52. The resolution reads in relevant part:
The General Assembly,
Considering that it is highly desirable that reparation be secured for injuries incurred in
the service of the United Nations,
Consequently
1. Authorizes the Secretary-General, in accordance with his proposals, to bring an
international claim against the Government of a State, Member or non-member of the
United Nations, alleged to be responsible, with a view to obtaining the reparation due
in respect of the damage caused to the United Nations and in respect of the damage
caused to the victim or to persons entitled through him and, if necessary, to submit to
arbitration, under appropriate procedures, such claims as cannot be settled by negotia-
tions;
2. Authorizes the Secretary-General to take the steps and to negotiate in each partic-
ular case the agreements necessary to reconcile action by the United Nations with such
rights as may be possessed by the State of which the victim is a national.
G.A. Res. 365, U.N. Doc. A/I101 & Corr. 1, at 200 (1949) (emphasis added).
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tion to exercise such a right. If the U.N. is obliged to bring such claims
and fails to do so, it might be held liable. If the exercise of such a right
is discretionary, failure to press a claim would not render the U.N.
liable.
There is no clear language in the Reparations Case or in Resolution
365 (IV) on this question. The background of the request for the advi-
sory opinion and of Resolution 365 (IV) was the increasing number of
injuries and deaths of U.N. staff in Palestine, and particularly the
deaths of Count Bernadotte and Colonel S6rot. These presented the
U.N. with legal questions as to its authority and the procedures by
which it could bring claims for injuries suffered through actions attrib-
utable to States.53 The I.C.J. opinion and the General Assembly reso-
lution both focused on the legal personality of the U.N. vis-/z-vis States,
not on the responsibility of the U.N. to its staff. Hence they provide
little guidance on this question. One must perforce turn to the regula-
tions determining the relationship between the staff and the organiza-
tion, the practice of the U.N., and the practice outside the U.N. system.
The Staff Rules and the Staff Regulations54 do not refer to the obli-
gation of the Secretary-General to bring international claims on behalf
of injured staff, but they do obligate the Secretary-General, as the
Chief Administrator of the organization, to pay compensation to staff
injured during the course of their official duties. In practice, however,
the U.N. has brought international claims against governments of
States alleged to have caused injuries to its staff during peace-keeping
missions. The great majority of these claims were not settled and the
States did not agree to arbitration.
It might be argued that those incidents differ from the hypothetical
case, for the regime of peace-keeping operations is determined by
agreements with the States providing U.N. observers and by the Regu-
lations for Field Manual Operations. Both hold the U.N. responsible
for injuries to its agents in those operations. Though the U.N. did not
accept liability for injury to peace-keeping forces,5 5 it paid compensa-
tion to injured agents while bringing claims against the responsible
State. The explanation for thispraeter legem practice may be simple
pragmatism. The U.N. has become increasingly involved in peace-
keeping operations, and yet has had almost no success in collecting
53. See Reparation for Injuries Incurred in the Service of the United Nations, Memo-
randum by the Secretary-General, 3 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/674 (1948).
54. ST/SGB/Staff Rules/2/Rev.3 (1976); ST/SGB/Staff Rules/i/Rev. 5 (1979); ST/
SGB/Staff Rules/Appendix D/Rev.1 (1966).
55. See text accompanying notes 47-48 supra.
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damages for its injured agents from responsible States. Principles of
fairness and considerations of practicality have motivated the U.N. to
pay compensation, lest States be reluctant to contribute to operations in
the future. Past practice does not clarify policies for our hypothetical
case, because X was not on a special field operation and his injuries, at
least arguably, did not occur during the performance of his official
duties.
National practice with regard to comparable claims by citizens
against their own governments for diplomatic protection is pertinent.
In general, national courts have held that governments have discretion
to extend or withhold diplomatic protection for their citizens injured
abroad. In fact, governments have taken steps to protect the interests
of their citizens, although not always to the complete satisfaction of
those citizens. Though the President of the United States has a statu-
tory duty to extend diplomatic protection,5 6 federal courts always dis-
miss citizen suits against the Secretary of State for not doing so on the
ground that the government has discretion in the discharge of that obli-
gation. The trend of U.S. judicial decisions is conditioned by the gen-
eral policy of the courts not to interfere with the foreign policy
competence of the President. In all the disputed cases, the U.S. did
take steps to support the interests of the claimants, and the courts took
note of those steps.
In United States v. Dulles,57 the wife of an American soldier who was
tried and imprisoned in France for robbery brought suit against the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army, alleging that they
had failed to perform their respective duties in protecting her husband
from prosecution. The appellate court, in agreement with the lower
court's dismissal of the claim, viewed the case as one seeking a writ of
mandamus compelling the Secretary of State to obtain the soldier's re-
lease through diplomatic negotiations with France. Under the NATO
56. Regarding the release of citizens imprisoned by foreign governments, relevant U.S.
law provides:
Whenever it is made known to the President that any citizen of the United States has
been unjustly deprived of his liberty by or under the authority of any foreign govern-
ment, it shall be the duty of the President forthwith to demand of that government the
resasons of such imprisonment; and if it appears to be wrongful and in violation of the
rights of American citizenship, the President shall forthwith demand the release of such
citizen, and if the release so demanded is unreasonably delayed or refused, the Presi-
dent shall use such means, not amounting to acts of war, as he may think necessary and
proper to obtain or effectuate the release; and all the facts and proceedings relative
thereto shall as soon as practicable be communicated by the President to Congress.
22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1976) (emphasis added).
57. United States v. Dulles, 222 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1954).
The Yale Journal of World Public Order
Status of Armed Forces Treaty,5 8 the U.S. was required to have a rep-
resentative of the Staff Judge Advocate present at the trial. This was
done and no unconstitutional irregularities were reported. The court of
appeals held that
[the Secretary] was not under a legal duty to attempt through diplomatic
processes to obtain [the soldier's] release. Quite to the contrary, the com-
mencement of diplomatic negotiations with a foreign power is completely
in the discretion of the President and the head of the Department of State,
who is his political agent.59
In another case, Redpath v. Kissinger,60 the plaintiff, an American
citizen, claimed that he was incarcerated and tortured by Mexican offi-
cials, and that the American Secretary of State, Ambassador to Mexico,
Consul, and Consul-General negligently failed and refused to accord
him assistance. In dismissing the claim, the district court held that the
petitioner received services from the American consular officers. Noth-
ing showed that his arrest and conviction were improper. The Director
of Special Consular Services had made a special inquiry into the peti-
tioner's allegations of torture and found no substantiation. In dis-
missing the complaint, the district court stated that any further action
would have to be taken by the Executive Branch through the Secretary
of State. The court continued:
The Supreme Court has defined the powers of the courts of the United
States with respect to the disposition of matters such as the one under
consideration. In Oetfen v. CentralLeather Comfpany, 246 U.S. 297, 38 S.
Ct. 309, 62 L.Ed. 726 ... it was held that the conduct of foreign relations
of the United States is committed by the Constitution to the Executive
and Legislative Departments of the government, and the propriety of
what may be done in the exercise of these powers is not subject to judicial
inquiry or decision.61
The holding of a Belgian court on a similar issue was rather different.
A Belgian sued the U.N. and the Belgian government in the Civil Tri-
bunal of Brussels in 1966 in regard to the Congo operation. 62 The
plaintiff claimed that his property had been burned and looted by U.N.
forces. In 1962, he had lodged a claim against the U.N. for compensa-
tion. The U.N. disputed the facts of the claim, but, after intercession
by the Belgian government, declared that it was prepared to accept
58. Agreement Between Parties to North Atlantic Treaty Regarding Status of Their
Forces, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846, 199 U.N.T.S. 67.
59. 222 F.2d at 393-94.
60. Redpath v. Kissinger, 415 F. Supp. 566 (D. Tex. 1976).
61. Id. at 568.
62. M. v. Organisation des Nations Unies et l'Etat Beige (Ministre des Affaires Et-
rang~res), 45 I.L.R. 446 (Civ. Trib. Brussels 1966).
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financial liability if the injury was the result of action taken by U.N.
agents in violation of the laws of war and the rules of international law.
Before this claim was decided, the U.N. concluded a Global Settle-
ment Agreement with the Belgian government. This Agreement defini-
tively settled all claims brought against the U.N. by Belgian nationals
on account of damages to persons and property resulting from the con-
duct of U.N. forces in the Congo. The sum was determined according
to a list of the individual claims for which the U.N. accepted liability,
drawn up by its own authorities. The plaintiff was listed, but for less
than his claim. One of the claims the plaintiff lodged against the Bel-
gian government was for not having properly defended his interest.
The Civil Tribunal of Brussels responded:
If States generally ensure the protection of their nationals abroad and in
the face of international organizations, this course of action is only of
relative efficacy. There is, however, no law which imposes obligations upon
the executive power in this respect. In different circumstance certain per-
sonages, official or otherwise, did certainly assert that the Belgian State
would do everything within its power to ensure the protection in the
Congo of its nationals and their property. Declarations of this sort, which
are merely of a vague and general character, do not bind the executive
power in any precise manner.63
The Belgian and American courts used different language. The Civil
Tribunal emphasized that no law imposes obligations on the Belgian
government to protect the interests of its nationals abroad. The court
recognized a general obligation arising from the Belgian government's
declaration that it would ensure the protection of its nationals and their
property in the Congo, but it rejected anyprecise manner of implement-
ing that obligation. The court stated that the Belgian government had
performed its obligation by negotiating the Global Settlement Agree-
ment.64 The court emphasized that there was no law, bilateral agree-
ment, or unilateral commitment by the government to guarantee such
results. 65
The policy of American courts has been to refrain from interfering
with the President's conduct of foreign policy; the decision of the Bel-
gian court implies that there is a general obligation of the government
to protect the interests of its nationals injured abroad, though not in
63. Id. at 453 (emphasis added).
64. "In fact, to protect its nationals and their property, the second defendant [the Belgian
government] negotiated with the first defendant [the U.N.] in a way that was partially suc-
cessful, and arrived at the Agreement of 20 February 1965 [the global settlement agree-
ment]. ... " Id.
65. Id. at 454.
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any precise manner. Both the American and Belgian courts seem con-
cerned only with a demonstration of executive good faith in trying to
protect the interests of nationals abroad. In all the above cases, the
governments did attempt to protect the interests of their nationals. One
might hazard the proposition that, practically, both executives have ac-
cepted some general obligations in these matters.
From the standpoint of a policy concerned with the promotion of the
independent function of the U.N., the U.N. would appear to have re-
sponsibilities to protect the security, safety, and interests of its staff
where that staff operates. The Secretary-General must demonstrate
goodfath66 by taking measures to protect injured staff members. Of
course, the Secretary-General must accommodate organizational inter-
ests and effectiveness with the interests of individual staff members and
of host States. Host States can hardly claim a legitimate interest in
failing to afford appropriate legal processes for investigation and judg-
ment on charges they make against U.N. staff. In principle, the inde-
pendence of the U.N. is better served by protecting the independence
and safety of international civil servants.67 An expectation that steps
will be taken for the protection and safety of U.N. agents is essential to
staff morale and to the effective functioning of the organization. Other-
wise, U.N. agents might seek support and security through other
sources which could compromise their independence as international
civil servants.
May the Secretary-General bring claims against the State of nation-
ality of a staff member? In cases of double nationality, diplomatic pro-
tection generally may not be extended under international law by one
of the States to its national when the national is in the territory of the
other State of his or her nationality. If this doctrine were applicable,
the Secretary-General could not bring international claims against the
State of nationality of its staff member. But the practice of double na-
tionality is not applicable to the U.N. For one thing, the analogy is
inapposite; staff status is not akin to nationality. Indeed, the need to
protect an official's independence from his State of nationality has long
been recognized.68 Moreover, under Article V of the Convention on
66. The principle of good faith has been adopted by 1O administrative tribunals as a
general principle of law. M. AKEHURST, THE LAW GOVERNING EMPLOYMENT IN INTERNA-
TIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 72-73 (1967).
67. A staff will not be efficient, willing, and loyal unless its morale is high. The morale
of a staff is affected by the conditions under which it works. A. LOVEDAY, REFLECTIONS ON
INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION (1956).
68. The first Secretary-General of the League of Nations observed in 1925: "In theory,
at any rate, an official might find diplomatic privileges particularly necessary, as far as his
own Government was concerned." Letter of June 11, 1925 to head of Federal Political Dep't
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Privileges and Immunities, 69 Member States are obligated to refrain
from exercising their competence over citizens who are U.N. officials.70
The Secretary-General thus should have power to lodge international
claims against a staff member's State for injuries allegedly suffered by
the staff member.
D. Acts Ultra Vires
An international organization is a creature of limited powers.
Whatever immunity it may enjoy will not extend to acts which exceed
its jurisdiction or powers, acts commonly described as ultra vires or in
excns depouvoir.
Ultra vires acts may be the result of misallocation of competences
within the internal structure of IOs. The I.C.J. suggested that an act
illegal in terms of allocation of competences within the U.N. will not
necessarily be void vis-a-vis third parties.71 That does not mean that in
all cases a commitment concluded in violation of internal allocations of
competence will be upheld, but it does mean that third parties should
not be penalized by termination of an arrangement on which they re-
lied in good faith.72 While the problem of ultra vires acts applies to all
IOs, the discussion here will refer to problems that may be pending
with regard to the Council for Namibia, in particular the possibilities of
claims against the Council by States or by the future State of Namibia
for acts allegedly beyond the authority of the Council.
of Switzerland, L.N. Doc. C.66 (1925), reprinted in M. HILL, IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES
OF INTERNATIONAL OFFICIALS 166 (1947). Similarly, scholars unanimously recognize and
endorse the unique necessity for immunity of U.N. employees from the influence of their
own countries. E.g., id. at 98-99; D. BowETT, supra note 10, at 320; C. JENKS, INTERNA-
TIONAL IMMUNITIES 112 (1961).
In the Reparations Case, the LC.J. stated that if a U.N. official "had to rely on that State
[of which he was a national], his independence might well be compromised, contrary to the
principle applied by Article 100 of the Charter." [1949] I.CJ. at 183.
69. Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, done Feb. 13, 1946,
art. V, 21 U.S.T. 1418, T.I.A.S. No. 6900, 1 U.N.T.S. 15, 24-26.
70. As the I.C.J. stated in the Reparations Case, this convention creates rights and duties
between the organization and each of the signatories. [1949] I.C.J. at 179.
The convention provides that it shall
continue in force as between the United Nations and every Member which has depos-
ited an instrument of accession for so long as that Member remains a Member of the
United Nations, or until a revised general convention has been approved by the Gen-
eral Assembly and that Member has become a party to this revised convention.
Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, supra note 69, § 35.
71. Advisory Opinion on Certain Expenses of the United Nations, [1962] I.C.J. 151, 168.
72. See D. BowEir, supra note 10, at 325. For a general study of ultra vires acts com-
mitted by 1Os, see Lauterpacht, The Legal Effects of llegalActs of International Organiza-
lions, in CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 88-121 (1965).
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Since General Assembly Resolution 2248 (S-V) of May, 1967, 73 the
Council has been representing Namibia, first as an observer and, by a
later decision of the General Assembly, as a full member in U.N. meet-
ings and conferences. 74 In addition, the Council has undertaken other
functions, such as issuing identity certificates and travel documents to
Namibians. The Council has already concluded agreements with more
than 90 countries concerning travel arrangements for Namibians. 75 It
has concluded agreements with Zambia for the establishment of an In-
stitute in Lusaka for training Nanibians as civil servants of the future
independent State of Namibia.76 On September 27, 1974, the Council
enacted Decree No. 1 for the protection of the natural resources of
Namibia,77 and it has acted as trustee for the United Nations Fund for
Namibia.78 It has also been authorized by the General Assembly to
73. The resolution reads in relevant part:
The General Assembly,
1. Decides to establish a United Nations Council for South West Africa (hereinafter
referred to as the Council) comprising eleven Member States to be elected during the
present session and to entrust to it the following powers and functions, to be discharged
in the Territory:
(a) To administer South West Africa until independence, with the maximum possi-
ble participation of the people of the Territory;
(b) To promulgate such laws, decrees and administrative regulations as are neces-
sary for the administration of the Territory until a legislative assembly is established
following elections conducted on the basis of universal adult suffrage;
(c) To take as an immediate task all the necessary measures, in consultation with
the people of the Territory, for the establishment of a constituent assembly to draw up a
constitution on the basis of which elections will be held for the establishment of a legis-
lative assembly and a responsible government;
(d) To take all the necessary measures for the maintenance of law and order in the
Territory;
(e) To transfer all powers to the people of the Territory upon the declaration of
independence;
2. Decides that in the exercise of its powers and in the discharge of its functions the
Council shall be responsible to the General Assembly.
G.A. Res. 2248 (S-V), Fifth Special Session, Supp. (No. 1), U.N. Doc. A/L.516/Rev.1
(1967).
74. Relevant General Assembly resolutions are: G.A. Res. 3111, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 30) 93, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974); G.A. Res. 3067, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 13,
U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974); G.A. Res. 3104, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 143, U.N. Doc.
A/9030 (1974); G.A. Res. 3295, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 106, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1975); G.A. Res. 3399, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 104, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1976);
G.A. Res. 31/108,31 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 58, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1977); G.A. Res.
31/147, 31 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 132, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1977); G.A. Res. 31/149,
31 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 134, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1977); G.A. Res. 31/179, 31 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 82, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1977); G.A. Res. 31/9, 32 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 45) 19, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1978).
75. 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 24) 43, U.N. Doc. A/32/24 (1977).
76. 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 24) 54, U.N. Doc. A/10024 (1976).
77. For reference to this decree, see G.A. Res. 3399,30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 104,
U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1976).
78. G.A. Res. 3112, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 95, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1974).
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seek effective means to regulate foreign economic entities operating in
Namibia,7 9 to seek to replace South Africa as the party representing
Namibia in all relevant bilateral and multilateral treaties,8 o to direct
and coordinate the implementation of the Nationhood Program for
Namibia in consultation with SWAPO,81 and to assign radio frequen-
cies.82 Recently, there has been some discussion as to whether the
Council can become party to a convention on behalf of Namibia. This
issue raises in sharpest form the question of the extent of the Council's
authority to bind the future state of Namibia. If the Council acts be-
yond its authority, States suffering injuries, including the future State
of Namibia, might be potential claimants against the Council, and con-
sequently against the U.N.
The Council of Namibia is a unique and virtually unprecedented
creation in international relations. As a U.N. organ and as an adminis-
tering authority, it has two functions. They raise the question of the
extent of the authority of the Council. Many functions of an adminis-
tering authority are not compatible with the authority of a U.N. organ.
Moreover, the scope of authority of a U.N. organ may prove too lim-
ited effectively to administer a territory to independence. When the
U.N. decided to undertake direct administration of Namibia and to
lead it toward independence, it had to establish a body for that func-
tion. From the bureaucratic point of view, a body established within
the U.N. system was easier to manage, finance, and influence. Because
the Council consists of a number of States Members of the U.N.,
elected by the General Assembly, ultimate responsibility for the Coun-
cil's work is arguably borne by the U.N. This consideration might lead
to a narrow construction of the Council's competence. On the other
hand, as an administering authority, the Council has a political func-
tion that a U.N. organ lacks. The fulfillment of that function cannot be
handicapped by the inherent limited authority of a U.N. organ, for that
would frustrate the Council's very raison d'etre.
The Council is responsible for all measures leading to Namibian in-
dependence. Actions taken by the Council should facilitate and hasten
the process of independence. The Council's authority should not be
confused with that of a State or a Government. The Council is neither.
79. G.A. Res. 3031, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 88, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972).
80. Id.
81. G.A. Res. 31/147, 31 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 133, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976);
G.A. Res. 31/148, 31 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 133, U.N. Do. A/31/39 (1976); G.A.
Res. 31/150,31 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 134, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976); G.A. Res. 31/
153, 31 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 39) 136, U.N. Do. A/31/39 (1976).
82. G.A. Res. 32/9C, 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 45) 15, U.N. Doc. A/32/45 (1977).
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It is an organization with a limited authority, part of which has tradi-
tionally been associated only with States. In situations where the func-
tions of the Council and those of a State are the same, similar
competence may be presumed for both.83 The Council has been em-
powered by General Assembly Resolution 3031 (XXVII) "to seek to
replace South Africa as the party representing Namibia in all relevant
bilateral and multilateral treaties." 84 The authority of the Council is
limited, however, to actions leading to the independence of the terri-
tory. While the Council may ratify a treaty, the treaty must facilitate
the independence of Namibia. Were the Council to act beyond its au-
thority, purporting to bind the future State of Namibia with obligations
not relevant to its independence, the Council, and derivatively the
U.N., might be held responsible.
The procedure for bringing State claims against the Council is not
clear. Under Article 81 of the Charter,85 an administering authority
may be one or more States of the organization itself, but with the ex-
ception of the Council and the U.N.T.E.A. for West Irian, administer-
ing authorities have always been individual States. In all trusteeship
agreements with States, a provision has provided for claims by Member
States against the administering authority.86 A similar provision ap-
peared in agreements relating to the mandate system. On that basis,
Ethiopia and Liberia unsuccessfully sued South Africa in the I.C.J. for
that country's misconduct as the mandatory power of South West
Africa.87
Such provisions have not been enacted in relation to the Council for
Namibia. Because every major move taken by the Council has been
either authorized or subsequently approved by General Assembly reso-
lutions, there appears to be no expectation of future claims against the
Council as such. The General Assembly's endorsement does not, how-
ever, necessarily eliminate the possibility of future claims. 88 In its 1971
83. See text accompanying notes 76, 77, & 81 supra.
84. G.A. Res. 3031, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 88, 89, U.N. Doe. A/8730 (1973).
85. U.N. CHARTan art. 81.
86. For example, the agreement establishing the trusteeship for the Cameroons provides:
If any dispute whatever should arise between the Administering Authority and another
Member of the United Nations relating to the interpretation or application of the provi-
sions of this Agreement, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation or other
means, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice, provided for in Chapter
XIV of the United Nations Charter.
Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of the Cameroons, Dec. 13, 1946, Untied Nations-
United Kingdom, art. 19, 8 U.N.T.S. 119, 132.
87. South-West Africa Cases 1, [1962] I.C.J. 13.
88. In the Reparations Case, the I.C.J. described the U.N. as a subject of international
law, having a distinctive legal personality and capable of possessing both rights and duties.
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advisory opinion on Namibia, the I.C.J. indicated its willingness to ap-
praise the activities, not only of the South African government, but also
of the Security Council and of the General Assembly for conformity to
fundamental law.89 Indeed, in two cases, the Court did review the law-
fulness of acts by constituent bodies of IOs.90 The I.C.J. would have
the competence to render an advisory opinion on the request of the
General Assembly or of the Security Council on the activities of the
Council for Namibia. If authorized, the I.C.J. might declare void an
illegal act of the Council, even though that act had been endorsed by
the General Assembly.
E. Violation of International Agreements
The term "international agreements" is used here to refer to agree-
ments between IOs or between IOs and States. The U.N. has con-
cluded a large number of such agreements. 9' Article 43 of the U.N.
Charter92 empowers the Security Council to enter into agreements with
Member States or groups of Member States regarding armed forces,
See 'note 70 supra. Activities in violation of fundamental law might be brought within the
confines of classic excs depouvoir. Professors McDougal, Lasswell, and Chen draw a simi-
lar conclusion in relation to violation of principles of human rights by 1Os and their officials.
M. McDouGAL, H. LASSWELL, & L. CHEN, supra note 6, at 334.
Some IOs make explicit provisions for review of lawfulness of acts done by constituent
bodies. See Lauterpacht, supra note 72, at 94-99; McRae, Legal Obligations and Interna-
tional Organizations, 11 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 87 (1973).
89. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia, [1971] I.C.J. 6,45. See also M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL, & L. CHEN, supra note
6, at 334-35.
90. Advisory Opinion on the Constitution of the Maritime Safety Commission of the
I.M.C.O., [1960] I.C.J. 150; Certain Expenses of the United Nations, [1962] I.C.J. 151. For a
discussion of these cases, see Lauterpacht, supra note 72, at 100-16; D. BoWETr, supra note
10, at 250-52, 323-25.
91. The U.N. has concluded agreements with both member and non-memlter States and
with other IOs. These agreements concern technical assistance; adhoc conferences or semi-
nars; permanent installations (e.g., information centers or regional economic commissions);
operations of subsidiary organs (e.g., UNICEF and the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (U.N.R.W.A.)); the status of forces involved
in peace-keeping operations; provision of peace-keeping troops; and communication and
associated facilities (eg., stamp sales, mail dispatch, and radio operations). See, e.g., Agree-
ment on the Ariana Site, July 1, 1946, United Nations-Switzerland, I U.N.T.S. 153; Ex-
change of Letters on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Sept. 21, 1951,
United Nations-Korea, 104 U.N.T.S. 323; Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the
United Nations, July 25, 1952, United Nations-Japan, 135 U.N.T.S. 305.
In response to an inquiry by the International Law Commission Special Rapporteur on
the Law of Treaties, the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs provided a survey of U.N. arrange-
ments with States that correspond to credentials or full powers. See [1967] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 222. For a discussion of U.N. treaties with States and IOs, see Parry, Treaty-Mak-
ing Power of the United Nations, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 108, 131-47 (1950); G. WEISSBERG,
supra note 10, at 38-69.
92. U.N. CHARTER art. 43.
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assistance, and facilities necessary for maintaining international peace
and security. These agreements "shall be subject to ratification by the
signatory States in accordance with their constitutional processes." In
the Reparations Case,93 the I.C.J. stated that the U.N. also becomes
party to international agreements concluded under the trusteeship pro-
visions of the Charter.94 By virtue of Article 105 of the Charter,95 the
U.N. is a party to the Convention on Privileges and Immunities,
"which binds the United Nations as an Organization on the one part,
and each of its Members individually, on the other part.
96
The Court also stated that the U.N. "must be deemed to have those
powers which, though not expressly provided for in the Charter, are
conferred upon it by necessary implication as being essential to the per-
formance of its duties."' 97 On the strength of this dictum, the I.L.C.'s
Special Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties proposed that the I.L.C.
consider adopting a provision recognizing the capacity of subjects of
international law other than States to conclude treaties when invested
with the capacity to do so by treaty or custom.98 Though the I.L.C.
decided that the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
should deal only with agreements between States, it "fully accepted
that international organizations may possess treaty-making capacity
and that international agreements concluded by international organiza-
tions possessing such capacity fall within the scope of the law of trea-
ties." 99 Moreover, the regulations adopted by the General Assembly to
93. Reparations Case, [1949] I.C.J. 174.
94. Trusteeship agreements do not become effective until approved and authorized by
the competent U.N. organs.
95. U.N. CHARTER art. 105.
96. Oral Argument of Counsel for .Secretary-General, Reparation for Injuries Suffered
in the Service of the United Nations, I.CJ. Pleadings 71 (1949).
97. Reparations Case, [1949] I.C.J. at 182.
98. First Report on the Law of Treaties, [1962] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 30, 35, U.N.
Doe. A/CN.4/SER.A/1962/Add.l.
For a discussion of the international personality of IOs and their capacity to conclude
agreements, see H. CHiu, THE CAPACITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO CON-
CLUDE TREATIES AND THE SPECIAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE TREATIES SO CONCLUDED
(1966); H. KELSEN, supra note 10; Hartmann, The Capacity o/International Organizations to
Conclude Treaties, in AGREEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 127 (K. Zemanek ed. 1971); McRae, Cooperation
Agreements and the Law Relating to Agreements Concluded by International Organizations, in
id., at 1, 5-6; Osakwe, The Concept and Forms of Treaties Concluded by International Organi.
zations, in id., at 165; van Wouw, Formal Aspects of the Technical Assistance Agreements
Concluded by the U.N. Family of Organizations, in id., at 105; Hahn, supra note 10; Osakwe,
Contemporary Soviet Doctrine on the Judicial Nature of Universal International Organiza-
tions, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 502 (1971); Rosenne, United Nations Treaty Practice, 86 HAGUE
RECUEiL 281 (1954); Smith, The Conclusion of InternationalAgreements by International Or-
ganizations, 2 Loy. CHI. L.J. 27 (1971).
99. First Report on the Law of Treaties, supra note 98, at 30. The 1969 Vienna Confer-
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give effect to Article 102 of the Charter concerning treaty registration
expressly refer to cases where the U.N. is a party to a treaty or an
agreement. 1oo
The E.E.C. has concluded treaties on tariff, commercial, and associa-
tion matters under Articles 111, 113, and 238 of its Statute.10 1 Associa-
tion agreements have been concluded with Greece, Turkey, Malta, and
a number of African countries.102 Initially, the E.E.C. attended the
Commodity Conferences as an observer or participant without a vote.
Later it participated as a member with voting rights (exercised through
collective votes of its members) and became party to commodity con-
ventions which provided for the E.E.C.'s participation and accession. 103
The E.E.C. has also become party to other commodity agreements pro-
ence recommended that the General Assembly refer the question of treaties concluded be-
tween States and IOs or between two or more 1Os to the International Law Commission for
study in consultation with the principal IOs. Report of the International Law Commission,
29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 10) 129, U.N. Doc. A/9610/Rev.1 (1974). The General Assem-
bly referred the question to the International Law Commission in G.A. Res. 2501, 24 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 97, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1970). The Commission appointed Mr. Reu-
ter as Special Rapporteur. His report follows the form and substance of the Vienna Conven-
tion. So far a complete set of draft articles have been adopted by the International Law
Commission. See Report of the International Law Commission, 35 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 10) 136-78, U.N. Do. A/35/10 (1980).
The International Law Commission attempt is a response to the increasing participation
of 1Os in making treaties. The draft articles modelled on the Vienna Convention do not,
however, deal with remedies. In the absence of codification, this is a matter that must be
dealt with in the treaties themselves.
100. U.N. CHARTER art. 102.
101. Treaty of Rome, supra note 24, arts. 111, 113, 238.
102. Malawer, Treaty-Making Competence of the European Communities, 7 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 169, 175 (1973). For the treaty-making power of the E.E.C., and particularly the
allocation of competences within the E.E.C., see P. KAPTEYN & P. VELOREN VAN THEMAAT,
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMuNITmEs (1973); Costonis, The Treaty-
Making Power of the European Economic Community, 5 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 421 (1968);
Costonis, The Treaty-Mfaking Power of the European Community: Alrticle 238 and Assoc.
Agreements, [1967] EuR. Y.B. 31 (Council of Europe); Feld, The Competenes of the Euro-
pean Communitiesfor the Conduct of External Relations, 43 TEx. L. REv. 891 (1965).
The most important case in this area has been the E.R.T.A. Case, No. 22/70. See COM-
MON MKT. L. REv. 392 (1971).
103. The first such commodity agreement, the International Wheat Agreement of 1971,
provided that:
Any reference in this Convention to a "Government" represented at the United Nations
Wheat Conference, 1971 shall be construed as including a reference to the European
Economic Community (hereinafter referred to as the E.E.C.). Accordingly, any refer-
ence in the Convention to "signature" or to the "deposit of instruments of ratification,
acceptance or approval" or "an instrument of accession" or a "declaration of provi-
sional application" by a Government shall, in the case of the E.E.C. be construed as
including its competent authority and the deposit of the instrument required by institu-
tional procedures of the E.E.C. to be deposited for the conclusion of an international
agreement.
International Wheat Agreement, openedfor sgnature Mar. 29-May 3, 1971, § 1(n), 22 U.S.T.
821, T.I.A.S. No. 7144, 800 U.N.T.S. 45, 54. The sugar agreements of 1973 and 1977 con-
tained similar provisions. International Sugar Agreement, Oct. 13, 1973, art. II, § 11, U.N.
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viding for participation and accession of "intergovemmental organiza-
tions" not limited to the E.E.C.1 4 In another area, the E.E.C. has
joined the 1976 Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean
Sea Against Pollution.10 5
The above conventions impose a rather limited responsibility on
their members. In the 1978 Geneva session of the Law of the Sea Con-
ference, proposals to allow the E.E.C. to become party to the future
Law of the Sea Convention were put forward. The subject is still under
.consideration. If accepted, the E.E.C. could be the first international
organization to become a party to a sweeping international convention
establishing extensive legal responsibilities with potential for future
liability.
III. The Decision Processes
The variety of arenas in which decisions about responsibility are
made relate primarily to the status of different claimants and the cir-
cumstances in which injuries occur. Most disputes regarding IOs' re-
sponsibilities have been settled through informal methods. This
practice may be attributed mainly to the political overtone surrounding
many 10 activities. Complainants may also lack awareness or prece-
dent for processing disputes through more formal arenas, or they may
be insecure about the outcome of formal processes. Nevertheless, sev-
eral formal judicial arenas exist in which claims regarding 10 responsi-
bility may be submitted. Some of these arenas have been provided for
in IOs' constituent instruments, some have been created by IOs them-
selves, and some have resulted from the expanded competence of IOs
through development of international or domestic law. This section
will examine negotiation, arbitration, claims commissions, national
courts, the I.C.J., and administrative tribunals.
A. Negotiation
In most legal disputes, negotiation is the first step in resolving a con-
ffict. This method of dispute settlement is preferred by IOs, particu-
Doc. TD/SUGAR.8/4 (1973); International Sugar Agreement, done Oct. 7, 1977, art. 2,
§ 23, T.I.A.S. No. 9664.
104. International Cocoa Agreement, concluded Oct. 21, 1972, art. 4, 882 U.N.T.S. 67;
International Coffee Agreement, openedfor signature Jan. 31-July 31, 1976, art. 4, § 3, 28
U.S.T. 6401, T.I.A.S. No. 8683; International Tin Agreement, done June 21, 1975, art. 54, 28
U.S.T. 4619, T.I.A.S. No. 8607, U.N. Doc. TD/TIN.5/10 & TD/TIN.5/10/Corr.1-4 (1975).
Although these commodity agreements provide for the accession of any competent 10, so far
only the E.E.C. has ratified them.
105. For the final act of the conference, see 15 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALs 285 (1976).
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larly those with extensive immunities.1 0 6 Most of the claims against the
U.N. and the specialized agencies have been resolved by negotiation.
The preference for this method as the first step for dispute settlement is
expressed in all agreements between the U.N. and other parties.107 Ne-
gotiation has been recommended as the preferred method of dispute
settlement in General Assembly Resolution 365 (IV), which authorizes
the Secretary-General to bring international claims against States al-
leged to have injured his agents. The resolution provides that he may
submit disputes to arbitration if they cannot be settled by
negotiation.108
B. Arbitral Tribunals
Arbitration is a common mode of dispute settlement concerning
transactions between third parties and IOs, particularly those with ex-
tensive immunities. Almost all contracts to which the U.N. is a party
contain a standard arbitration clause:
Arbitration shall be the sole means of resolving any dispute or differences
which may arise out of the contract or the carrying out of the works....
All arbitration under this contract shall be in accordance with the rules
then in force of the International Chamber of Commerce. The award of
such arbitration shall be final and binding on the parties.10 9
There is usually a single arbitrator. Arbitration has also been provided
for in the Headquarters Agreement" 0 and for settlement of disputes
106. For 1Os with extensive immunities, the only methods of dispute settlement are ne-
gotiation and arbitration (if agreed to in advance). These IOs will not waive their immunity
under any condition, particularly when dealing with private parties. At the same time, in
order to guarantee their good faith with the contracting party, they must propose a method
of dispute settlement. Normally the method proposed is negotiation, with later arbitration if
necessary.
107. Virtually all U.N. service contracts include such a provision. These contracts are
unpublished.
108. G.A. Res. 365, U.N. Doc. A/l101, at 200 (1949).
109. These contracts are unpublished. For the place of arbitration, see [1964] U.N. Ju-
RiDICAL Y.B. 223-24.
110. This agreement provides:
21. (a) Any dispute between the United Nations and the United States concerning
the interpretation or application of this agreement or of any supplemental agreement,
which is not settled by negotiation or other agreed mode of settlement, shall be referred
for final decision to a tribunal of three arbitrators, one to be named by the Secretary-
General, one to be named by the Secretary of State of the United States, and the third
to be chosen by the two, or, if they should fail to agree upon a third, then by the Presi-
dent of the International Court of Justice.
(b) The Secretary-General or the United States may ask the General Assembly
to request of the International Court of Justice an advisory opinion on any legal ques-
tion arising in the course of such proceedings. Pending the receipt of the opinion of the
Court, an interim decision of the arbitral tribunal shall be observed by both parties.
Thereafter, the arbitral tribunal shall render a final decision, having regard to the opin-
ion of the Court.
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between host States and the U.N. regarding the interpretation and ap-
plication of agreements on peace-keeping operations.11"' Arbitration
may be ci .-,en for disputes regarding the "privileges and immunities of
the U.N." 112
In agreements defining the relationship between the U.N. and the
specialized agencies, no provision for arbitration is made. The Admin-
istrative Committee on Coordination is probably the appropriate body
to settle disputes. Outside the U.N. family, the use of arbitration is not
common. Headquarters Agreements between France and the Council
of Europe, or the E.E.C., and between the U.S. and the O.A.S. contain
no arbitration clause.
C. Claims Commissions
All agreements between the U.N. and host countries concerning the
status of U.N. peace-keeping forces include provision for a claims com-
mission to decide claims made by:
(i) a citizen of the host country in respect of damages alleged to result
from an act or omission of a member of the Force relating to his
official duties;
(ii) the Government against a member of the Force; or
(iii) the Force or the Government against one another."13
While a claims commission is a formal arbitral tribunal composed of
three judges, the scope of its activities is limited. Of the three arbitra-
tors, two are appointed separately by the Secretary-General and the
Headquarters Agreement, June 26, 1947, United Nations-United States, § 21, 61 Stat. 3416,
T.I.A.S. No. 1676, 11 U.N.T.S. 11.
111. See notes 32 & 34-37 and accompanying text supra.
112. The Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations provides
that the I.CJ. is the appropriate decision-maker on claims regarding the interpretation and
application of the convention, unless the parties have agreed on "another mode of settle-
ment." Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, supra note 69,
§ 30. That proviso would appear to refer to negotiation and arbitration. The headquarters
agreement of the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America refers to section 30 as a
settlement method in the event of disputes on privileges and immunities. Agreement for
Headquarters of the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America, Feb. 16, 1953, United
Nations-Chile, § 21, 314 U.N.T.S. 49.
Some States have made reservations regarding the reference to the I.C.J. in section 30.
Those States are Albania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Byelorussian S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Mongolia, Nepal, Romania, Ukrainian S.S.R., and the Soviet Union. The United Kingdom
notified the Secretary-General that it objects to the reservations made by Albania, Byelorus-
sian S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, the Soviet Union, and the Ukrainian
S.S.R. Lebanon notified the Secretary-General that it objects to the reservation of the Soviet
Union. See Relations Between States and Inter-Go vernmental Organizations, [1967] 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 133, 296, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1967/Add.l.
113. See, eg., Exchange of Letters Concerning Status of the United Nations Peace-'





host State, and the chairman is appointed jointly by the Secretary-Gen-
eral and the host State. The arbitrators need not be lawyers, and they
may participate in settlement of the claims.114 Awards made by a
claims commission against the Force or a member thereof or against
the Government are to be referred for satisfaction to the Commander
of the Force or to the Government, as the case may be.'15 The agree-
ments do not indicate whether the decision of a claims commission is
final. To date, no claims commission has been established.
D. National Courts
The distinctive feature about dispute settlement in national courts is
the doctrine of organizational immunity. Because of their functions,
IOs need immunities to protect them from improper influence by Mem-
ber States and to prevent interruption of work. Immunity, however,
does not necessarily mean "absolute" immunity, for not all activities
undertaken by IOs are within their principal functions. IOs may con-
duct activities of a so-called private law nature that only minimally
affect their major functions, but that may have adverse impact on the
public order of a particular State. The appropriate degree of immunity
of IOs from suits in local courts should depend on (1) the nature of the
IOs (the degree of universality), (2) the purpose of the IOs (the exten-
siveness of the function), (3) the intention of 10 members as expressed
in the constituent instruments of IOs and subsequent agreements,
(4) practice, and (5) the particular acts in question.
The U.N. seems to be the only 10 whose absolute immunity is im-
plied in its constitution and confirmed in the subsequent agreements
with its Member States. Under Article 105 of the Charter 16 and under
the Convention on Privileges and Immunities, 117 the U.N. is immune
from the jurisdiction of local courts.
Article 105 has been interpreted in several suits against the U.N. as
providing absolute immunity from suit in local courts. In Nissan v.
Attorney-General,18 a British subject, the tenant of a hotel in Cyprus
114. See, e.g., id. at 80.
115. See also Agreement on Legal Status, Facilities, Privileges, and Immunities of the
United Nations Organization in the Congo, Nov. 27, 1961, para. 11, United Nations-Congo,
414 U.N.T.S. 229.
116. "The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privi-
leges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes." U.N. CHARTER
art. 105. Paragraph 3 of the same article authorizes the General Assembly to specify the
details of the immunity. The Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations provides for absolute immunity.
117. Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, supra note 69, § 2.
118. Nissan v. Attorney-General, [1968] 1 Q.B. 286, [1970] A.C. 179 (H.L.).
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occupied by British troops before and after they joined the U.N. Peace-
keeping Force in Cyprus (U.N.F.I.CYP), brought suit for compensa-
tion and damages from the British government. On appeal, the House
of Lords held that the British troops were responsible for injuries they
caused before they joined the U.N. force. As for injuries they caused
after they became part of U.N.F.I.CYP, an organ of the U.N., they
enjoyed the status, privileges, and immunities of the Organization, and
British courts had no jurisdiction over them.
The Brussels Appeals Court went much further in Mandelier v.
United Nations and Belgian State.'1 9 In response to a claim made by a
Belgian who had suffered injuries allegedly "as a result of abuses com-
mitted by U.N. Forces in the Congo,' 120 the Court stated that the im-
munity from every form of legal process granted to the U.N. under the
Convention on Privileges and Immunities is unconditional. The Court
held that the organization's immunity is limited neither by Article VIII,
Section 29 of the Convention (requiring that the U.N. provide some
procedure for settlement of disputes), nor by Article 10 of the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights (stating that everyone is entitled to a
hearing by a tribunal in the determination of his rights and obliga-
tions),121 nor by Article 105 of the U.N. Charter 122 (referring to the
immunities necessary for the work of the organization). Similar deci-
sions have been rendered in Chile, l23 the U.S.,124 and Mexico. 25
In a few instances, national courts have issued default judgments
against the U.N. In X V. U.N._4.,126 execution was dropped after
communication with the Foreign Ministry of Lebanon. But a
Jordanian court, in Y v. UN.. W.A., 127 issued a default judgment and
execution in spite of claims of immunity. There was, however, no fur-
ther action to continue the claim.
Sometimes limited immunity is stated in an IO's constitution or a
subsequent document. Thus the competence of national courts is ac-
cepted in the constituent instruments of a number of financial IOs. For
119. Judgment of Sept. 15, 1969, Brussels Appeals Court, [1969] U.N. JURIDICAL Y.B.
236. See [1966] U.N. JURIDICAL Y.B. 283 for proceedings in the Brussels Court of First
Instance.
120. [1969] U.N. JURIDICAL Y.B. 236.
121. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/777, at 535 (1948).
122. U.N. CHARTm art. 105.
123. [1969] U.N. JuRmIcAL Y.B. 237.
124. Id. at 243.
125. See Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 9
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 1, 105-06, U.N. Doc. A/2663 (1954).
126. Id. at 106.




example, Article VII (3) of the Constitution of the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (I.B.R.D.) provides that the Bank
may be sued in the municipal courts of any member country where the
bank has an office, has appointed an agent to accept service of process,
or has issued or guaranteed securities, provided that the plaintiff is not
a Member State or someone claiming through a Member State. 128
These provisions in the constitutions of financial institutions have
been considered as waivers of immunities. When the Inter-American
Development Bank claimed immunity from suit in U.S. courts' 29 under
the International Organizations Immunities Act (I.O.I.A.), 130 the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that Article XI,
Section 3 of the Agreement Establishing the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank expressly waived immunity. That Article provides:
Actions may be brought against the Bank only in a court of competent
jurisdiction in the territories of a member in which the Bank has an office,
has appointed an agent for the purpose of accepting service or notice of
process, or has issued or guaranteed securities.' 31
The extent of the immunity of some IOs is unclear in both their con-
stitutions and subsequent agreements among their members. Determi-
nation of immunity of these organizations has been greatly influenced
by policies of "restrictive" immunity developed in the past decade as a
result of the modification of the notion of foreign "sovereign immu-
nity" in general. This modification is due to the increasing involve-
ment of sovereign States, and to a lesser degree of IOs, in commercial
activities. Courts now seem to distinguish between acts relating to the
"principal" functions and to the "private" nature of 1Os. The courts
tend to extend their jurisdiction over acts of a "private" or "commer-
cial" nature, but generally refuse to adjudicate claims in relation to
"public" law activities of those organizations. 32
The practice in the U.S. and in Italy, where the absolute immunity of
128. Accordingly, section 10 of the U.S. Bretton Woods Agreements Act of 1945 pro-
vides that any action brought within the United States by or against the I.M.F. or the
I.B.R.D. "shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States." 22 U.S.C. § 286(g)
(1976). This seems to refer to the competence of U.S. courts to entertain the action, rather
than to prescribe the applicable law.
Philippine law relating to the I.M.F. and the I.B.R.D., which is modelled on U.S. law,
provides for competence of national courts. Act of Nov. 20, 1945, Commonwealth Act No.
699, § 10, 41 Official Gazette of the Philippine Islands 761, 764 (1945).
129. Lutcher S.A. Cellulose e Papel v. Inter-American Development Bank, 382 F.2d 454
(D.C. Cir. 1967).
130. International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b) (1976).
131. Agreement Establishing Inter-American Development Bank, Apr. 8, 1959, art. XI,
§ 3, 10 U.S.T. 3029, T.I.A.S. No. 4397, 389 U.N.T.S. 69.
132. Although immunity in relation to "sovereign States" has been discussed extensively
by jurists, and a rich body of literature and case law has developed, scholars have not related
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1Os has been challenged, is instructive. In the U.S., in addition to the
Charter, the Headquarters Agreement, and the Convention on Privi-
leges and Immunities, which are specifically related to the U.N., the
I.O.I.A. provides:
International organizations, their property and their assets, wherever lo-
cated, and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy the same immunity from suit
and every form of judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign governments,
except that such organizations may expressly waive their immunity for
the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any contract.133
The I.O.I.A., which is applicable to all "international organizations,"
defines an international organization and authorizes the President to
designate which organizations shall enjoy such immunity. 134 The re-
examination of 10 immunity in U.S. courts has been conducted strictly
within the framework of the I.O.I.A., the Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act of 1976,135 and the constitutions of other 1Os. Recent cases
have not construed the U.N. Charter, the Convention on Privileges and
Immunities, or the Headquarters Agreement. Some language, which
has been construed, however, is similar in all these agreements. 36
The extent of O.A.S. immunity from suit in U.S. courts remains un-
clear. Under its Charter, the O.A.S. enjoys necessary immunity for the
exercise of its functions. 137 It has been recognized as a public interna-
tional organization for purposes of the I.O.I.A. In Dupree Associates v.
Organization of American States,138 the plaintiff, a private contractor,
brought suit for breach of contract against the O.A.S. and its Secretary-
General in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Claim-
ing that in 1954 President Eisenhower designated the O.A.S. as a "pub-
the concept to IOs, nor have many court decisions contributed to the clarification of this
legal issue. See C. JENKS, supra note 68.
133. 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b) (1976).
134. Under the International Organizations Immunities Act,
the term 'international organization' means a public international organizaton in which
the United States participates pursuant to any treaty or under the authority of any Act
of Congress authorizing such participation or making an appropriation for such partici-
pation, and which shall have been designated by the President through appropriate
Executive order as being entitled to enjoy the privileges, exemptions, and immunities
provided in this subchapter.
22 U.S.C. § 288a(b) (1976).
135. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1, 1330, 1332, 1391, 1441,
1602-1611 (1976).
136. Compare the language in U.N. CHARTER arts. 104, 105 with the principles of the
Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, supra note 69; Charter of
the Organization of American States, Additional Protocol, supra note 29, art. 139; Agree-
ment on Privileges and Immunities of O.A.S., Pan-Am. T.S. No. 22 (1950), [1950] 2 O.A.S.
ANN. 29-30.
137. Charter of the Organization of American States, supra note 29, art. 103.




lic international organization" within the meaning of the I.O.I.A.,
defendants moved to dismiss the claim on grounds of immunity from
suit. The immunity, they claimed, was later extended to the Permanent
Observers to the O.A.S. and to the members of their diplomatic staff 39
as well as to the representatives and advisers of Member States. Fur-
thermore, the O.A.S. claimed that Article 139 of the O.A.S. Charter
provides that the Organization "shall enjoy in the territory of each
member such . . immunities as are necessary for the exercise of its
functions and the accomplishment of its purposes." 14 In rejecting the
O.A.S. argument, the court held that Congress stated expressly in the
I.O.I.A. that "international organizations. . . shall enjoy the same im-
munity from suits ...as is enjoyed by foreign governments"1 41 and
that, since 1952, the State Department has used a "restrictive" concept
of immunity with respect to foreign sovereigns by distinguishing be-
tween "public" or "governmental" acts and "commercial" acts. The
court noted that the impact of the State Department's policy on juris-
dictional immunity was dealt with in Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisa-
ria General,142 in which the Second Circuit recognized that the
restrictive concept of immunity was the governing principle with re-
spect to immunity for foreign sovereigns. The D.C. court reasoned
that, because foreign sovereigns are only entitled to restrictive immu-
nity, and IOs under the I.O.I.A. are extended only that immunity en-
joyed by foreign sovereigns, it follows that IOs are entitled only to
"restricted" immunity. The district court concluded that the Second
Circuit's reasoning was the proper interpretation. Because the State
Department had refrained from urging that defendants be granted im-
munity, the O.A.S. motion to dismiss the claim was denied.
U.S. courts have refused jurisdiction, however, over claims related to
"public" functions of 1Os. In 1977, an ex-staff member, who had been
dismissed, brought suit against the International Telecommunications
Satellite Organization (Intelsat) in relation to the workmen's compen-
sation regime.1 43 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld a
trial court order dismissing the claim on the ground of the defendant'simmunity under the I.O.I.A.
139. Defendants cited Exec. Order No. 11931,41 Fed. Reg. 32689 (1976), reprinted in 22
U.S.C. § 288g, at 293 (1976).
140. Charter of the Organization of American States, Additional Protocol, supra note 29,
art. 139.
141. Dupree Assoc. v. O.A.S., No. 76-2335 (D.D.C., June 1 and June 22, 1977) (memo-
randum orders).
142. Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. de-
nied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
143. Weidner v. Intelsat, 392 A.2d 508 (D.C. 1978) (per curiam).
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In a more recent case, Broadbent v. Organization of American
States,'" the plaintiffs, dissatisfied with the decision of the O.A.S. Ad-
ministrative Tribunal concerning compensation for their dismissal
from the O.A.S., brought suit against the Organization in the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia, alleging breach of contract.
The court initially rejected a motion to dismiss the complaint on
grounds of immunity. The O.A.S. then filed a request for certification
for an interlocutory appeal of the order of the court. The U.N.,
W.H.O., I.B.R.D., the Inter-American Defense Board, and the Inter-
American Development Bank filed memoranda as amici curiae in sup-
port of the request for certification. In a final order of March 28, 1978,
the district court vacated its earlier order and dismissed the suit on the
grounds
that international organizations are immune from every form of legal pro-
cess except insofar as that immunity is expressly waived by a treaty or
expressly limited by a statute. The Court is further persuaded that this
Court has jurisdiction over lawsuits involving international organizations
only insofar as such jurisdiction is expressly provided for by statute. 145
On appeal,146 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
refused to decide the question of jurisdiction or whether "restrictive" or
"absolute" immunity applied to IOs. The court correctly observed that
the employment by IOs of internal administrative personnel is not
properly characterized as "doing business." The court supported this
view with a passage in the legislative history of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act.' 47 The court concluded that employment of civil ser-
vants is a non-commercial activity for purposes of restrictive immunity.
The exception for the employment of American citizens, the court ex-
plained, is not applicable to IOs, for their civil servants are inevitably
drawn either from American or "third country" nationals. Therefore,
"[i]n the case of international organizations, such an exception would
swallow up the rule of immunity for civil service employment dis-
putes."'148 The court clearly recognized that the denial of immunity to
IOs in employment contract disputes would open the door to interfer-
144. Broadbent v. O.A.S., 481 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1978), aft'd, 628 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
145. 481 F. Supp. at 908.
146. Broadbent v. O.A.S., 628 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
147. 628 F.2d at 34. The passage from the House Report on the bill reads: "Also public
or governmental and not commercial in nature would be the employment of diplomatic,
civil service, or military personnel, but not the employment of American citizens or third
country nationals by the foreign state in the United States." H. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1976), reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6614.
148. 628 F.2d at 34.
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International Organizations
ence by States in the internal affairs of 1Os, and consequently would
undermine the ability of 1Os to function effectively. 149 The court
granted immunity to the O.A.S. and dismissed the appeal.
Although there is no clear decision as to whether the immunity of
IOs is "absolute" or "restrictive," the trend seems to be toward a "re-
strictive" immunity. Even in Broadbent, where the court refused to de-
cide this issue, its reasoning for granting immunity also would have
been sound under a theory of "restrictive" immunity.
The immunity of specialized agencies is a different matter. Special-
ized agencies are intergovernmental organizations established under
Article 57 of the Charter and brought into relationship with the U.N.
under Article 63 of the Charter.150 While specialized agencies are
within the U.N. system, they do not necessarily and automatically en-
joy the same privileges and immunities as the U.N. A Convention on
the Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies, adopted in
1947,151 grants absolute immunity to specialized agencies. So far only
85 States have ratified it.
The constitutions of the specialized agencies make reference to their
immunities, but they differ substantially. Some, such as the constitu-
tions of the Food and Agriculture Organization (F.A.O.), the United
Nations Educational, Social, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),
and the Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization
(I.M.C.O.), provide absolute immunity.1 52 The constitutions of most
specialized agencies, however, refer to a vague immunity that might not
149. Id. at 35.
150. U.N. CHARTER arts. 57, 63.
151. Convention on Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies, Nov. 21, 1947,
33 U.N.T.S. 261.
152. "Each Member Nation undertakes, insofar as it may be possible under its constitu-
tional procedure, to accord to the Organization all the immunities and facilities which it
accords to diplomatic missions, including inviolability of premises and archives, immunity
from suit and exemption from taxation." Constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation, Oct. 16, 1945, art. XVI, § 2, 12 U.S.T. 980, T.I.A.S. No. 4803; UNICEF Constitution,
done Nov. 16, 1945, art. XII, 61 Stat. 2495, T.I.A.S. No. 1580, 4 U.N.T.S. 275; Convention
on the Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, Mar. 6, 1948, art. 50, 9
U.S.T. 621, T.I.A.S No. 4044, 289 U.N.T.S. 48. Article XII of the UNESCO Constitution
provides for the same privileges and immunities as do articles 104 and 105 of the U.N.
Charter, and article 50 of the I.M.C.O. Constitution refers to the Convention on the Privi-
leges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies. It must be noted, however, that not all States
are members of specialized agencies.
See also Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, art.
IX, § 3, 60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 (immunity from judicial process
except to extent expressly waived).
For a brief history of the constitutional provisions on privileges and immunities of special-
ized agencies, see D. MICHAELS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL SERVANTS OF SELECTED INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 111-23 (1970).
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be interpreted as absolute. For example, the constitutions of the
W.H.O., the International Atomic Energy Agency (I.A.E.A.), and the
World Intellectual Property Organization (W.I.P.O.) 153 provide that, in
the territories of their members, their respective agencies shall enjoy
such privileges and immunities as may be necessary for the fulfillment
of their functions. In the constitutions of other specialized agencies,
limited immunity is clearly stated. For example, the constitutions of
I.B.R.D., the International Development Association (I.D.A.), and the
International Finance Corporation (I.F.C.) provide that their immunity
is limited to actions brought by member States or by persons acting for
or deriving claims from them.154 The headquarters agreements of the
specialized agencies provide that they are immune from every form of
legal process unless they expressly waive their immunities.1 55 Such pro-
153. Constitution of the World Health Organization, openedfor signature July 22, 1946,
Chap. XV, 62 Stat. 2679, T.I.A.S. No. 1808, 14 U.N.T.S. 185; Statute of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, done Oct. 26, 1956, art. XV, 8 U.S.T. 1093, T.I.A.S. No. 3873, 276
U.N.T.S. 3; Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, July 14,
1967, art. 12, 21 U.S.T. 1749, T.I.A.S. No. 6932, 828 U.N.T.S. 3.
154. Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, Dec. 27, 1945, art. VII, § 3, 60 Stat. 1440, T.I.A.S. No. 1502, 2 U.N.T.S. 39; Articles of
Agreement of the International Development Association, approved Jan. 26, 1960, art. VIII,
§ 3, 11 U.S.T. 2284, T.I.A.S. No. 4607,439 U.N.T.S. 249; Articles of Agreement of the Inter-
national Finance Corporation, openedforsignature May 25, 1955, art. VI, § 3, 7 U.S.T. 2197,
T.I.A.S. No. 3620, 264 U.N.T.S. 117.
See also Convention on Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies, approved
Nov. 21, 1947, Annex VI, 33 U.N.T.S. 261 (relating to the I.B.R.D.); Constitution of the
International Labour Organisation, adopted Oct. 9, 1946, 62 Stat. 3485, T.I.A.S. No. 1868, 15
U.N.T.S. 35 (similar provisions).
The constitution of the International Fund for Agricultural Development refers to the
privileges and immunities necessary to the organization's independent exercise of its func-
tions. The extent of those privileges and immunities is specified in art. 10, § 2(b)-(c) of the
constitution as- follows:
(b)(i) In the territory of any Member that has acceded to the Convention on
Privileges'and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies in respect of the Fund .... as
defined in the standard clauses of that Convention as modified by an annex thereto
approved by the Governing Council;
(ii) In the territory of any Member that has acceded to the Convention on
Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies only in respect of agencies other
than the Fund,. . . as defined in the standard clauses of that Convention, except if such
Member notifies the Depositary that such clauses shall not apply to the fund or shall
apply subject to such modifications as may be specified in the notification;
(iii) . . . as defined in other agreements entered into by the Fund.
(c) In respect of a Member that is a grouping of States, it shall ensure that the
privileges and immunities referred to in this Article are applied in the territories of all
members of the grouping.
Agreement Establishing the International Fund for Agricultural Development, adopted June
13, 1976, art. 10, § 2(b)-(c), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.73/15 (1976).
155. W.H.O. Headquarters Agreement, entered into force July 17, 1948, art. 6, § 1, 26
U.N.T.S. 331; UNESCO Headquarters Agreement, July 2, 1954, art. 12, 357 U.N.T.S. 3;
F.A.O. Headquarters Agreement, Oct. 31, 1950, art. VIII, § 16, reprintedin Gazetta Officiale
(Jan. 27, 1951); I.A.E.A. Headquarters Agreement, Dec. 11, 1957, art. VIII, § 20, 339
U.N.T.S. 111.
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visions partially immunize the agencies from legal process only in the
local courts of the headquarters sites, and not in the courts of other
States.
Considering the limited number of States that have ratified the Con-
vention on the Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies, the
vague provisions on immunity in the constitutions of specialized agen-
cies, and the fact that not all States are members of the specialized
agencies, it would appear that these agencies could well be sued in local
courts. So far, no significant lawsuits have been brought against them.
States have generally respected the immunity of these organizations
from all legal process.156 As the Permanent Court of International Jus-
tice (P.C.I.J.) and the I.C.J. have repeatedly declared, 157 however, the
mere practice of abstention-not bringing suits against specialized
agencies-without consideration of conditioning factors, is insufficient
proof of the existence of an international legal custom requiring absten-
tion. Abstention may be based on ambiguous reasons unrelated to the
legal nature of a particular incident and consequently devoid of any
legal requirement. Hence, a contextual examination is critical for inter-
pretation of the following example.
In 1969, an employment claim against the F.A.O. was brought in a
court of first instance in Rome by a former F.A.O. employee of Italian
nationality. The court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.15 8
With regard to immunity it argued that "immunity could only be rec-
ognized with regard to public law activities, i.e., in the case of an inter-
national organization with regard to activities by which it pursues its
specfctpurpose (iure imperi) but not with regard to private law activi-
ties where the Organization acts on an equal footing with individuals
(utiprivatus)."15 9 In interpreting Article VIII of the F.A.O. Headquar-
ters Agreement, the court noted that the provision merely- confirmed
the general rules of customary international law, but could not be un-
derstood as granting absolute immunity.
156. See Relations Between States and lnter-Governmental Organizations, supra note 112,
at 302-03.
157. See The S.S. Lotus, [1927] P.C.IJ., ser. A, No. 10, at 28; Asylum Case, [1950] I.C.J.
266, 286; North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] LC.J. 3, 44. But cf. Nottebohm Case,
[1955] I.CJ. 4, 21-22 (Court relied on State restraint as evidence of existence of international
norm restricting freedom of action).
158. Giovanni Porru v. Food and Agricultural Organization, Judgment of June 25, 1969,
Rome Court of First Instance (Labor Section), summarized in 1969 U.N. JuRIrICAL Y.B.
238. The court stated that "the acts by which an international organization arranges its
internal structure fall undoubtedy in the category of acts performed in the exercise of its
established function and that in this respect therefore the Organization enjoys immunity
from jurisdiction." Id.
159. Id. (emphasis added).
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The above cases indicate a new trend in which national courts may
assume jurisdiction over claims in relation to activities unrelated to the
internal structure or the principal function of IOs. The U.N. and its
organs still enjoy absolute immunities in accordance with the Charter
and the Convention on Privileges and Immunities. The specialized
agencies, however, do not seem to enjoy such extensive immunities in
all countries and may well become targets in local courts for "private"
lawsuits.
E. International Court of Justice
Article 34(1) of the Statute of the Court limits access to the I.C.J. to
States. The U.N. and its authorized organs and agencies under Article
96 of the Charter1 60 may request advisory opinions. Therefore, the
I.C.J. is not open directly to claimants against 1Os. Even States which
may have claims against the U.N. have no direct access to the I.C.J.
They must have the General Assembly or the Security Council request
an advisory, opinion. Section 30 of the Convention on Privileges and
Immunities,161 which is repeated in a number of agreements between
States and the U.N., provides that all differences between the States
and the U.N. with regard to the interpretation of the Convention
should be referred to the I.C.J. unless the parties choose another
method of settlement. Accordingly, "a request shall be made for an
advisory opinion on any legal questions involved in accordance with
Article 96 of the Charter."' 62 Article 96 of the Charter provides that
the General Assembly or the Security Council may request the I.C.J. to
give an advisory opinion on any legal question. Paragraph 2 of Article
96 also provides that "[o]ther organs of the United Nations and special-
ized agencies, which may at any time be so authorized by the General
Assembly, may also request advisory opinions of the court on legal
questions arising within the scope of their activities."' 63 The General
Assembly has authorized most specialized agencies and some U.N. or-
gans to request advisory opinions at any time, without requiring special
authorization for each individual case. 1 "
160. U.N. CHARTER art. 96.
161. Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, supra note 69,
§ 30.
162. Id.
163. U.N. CHARTER art. 96, para. 2.





The responsibility of IOs towards their own employees has been rec-
ognized from the beginning. The first assembly of the League of Na-
tions adopted a recommendation to the effect that, in the case of
dismissal, all members of the Secretariat and the International Labour
Organisation (I.L.O.) appointed for a period of five years or more
would have the right to appeal to the League of Nations or to the
Council of the Governing Body of the I.L.O. 165 In 1927 the Assembly
established an administrative tribunal that, by its Statute, was compe-
tent to hear and decide any dispute between officials and the Secreta-
riat of the League of the I.L.O. concerning compensation payable to the
employees under the Staff Regulations.
166
After the establishment of the U.N., an appeals board was set up in
1947 to advise the Secretary-General, with whom the final decision
rested, with respect to appeals by staff members.167 Later, in Decem-
ber, 1949, by Resolution 351 (MV),168 the General Assembly established
an administrative tribunal to hear and pass judgment on cases of non-
observance of employment contracts and terms of appointment. When,
in 1953, the Tribunal rendered certain judgments ordering the Secre-
tary-General to pay a large indemnity to officials whose appointment
had been terminated, the question was raised in the Assembly whether
the latter had the right to refuse the order and, if so, on what grounds.
General Assembly Resolution 785 (VIII)16 9 submitted these questions
to the I.C.J. for an advisory opinion. In emphasizing the obligation of
the Secretary-General to obey the Tribunal's judgments, the Court
opined that, in signing a contract, the Secretary-General, as the Chief
Administrator, "engages the legal responsibility of the Organization,
which is the judicial person on whose behalf he acts."'170  _
Presently most major IOs have administrative tribunals. Access is
limited to staff and competence is limited to matters of staff contractual
rights and terms of appointment. Only the Statute of the I.L.O. Ad-
ministrative Tribunal provides in Article 11(4) that it has competence
over "disputes arising out of a contract to which the I.L.O. is a party
165. See League of Nations, First Assembly (1920), plenary mtg., at 663-64.
166. M. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS: PAST AND FuTuRE 220-22 (1944). See
also RANSHOFEN-WERTHEIMER, THE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT 259-62 (1945).
167. Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 2 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 1, 77, U.N. Doec. A/315 (1947).
168. G.A. Res. 351, U.N. Doc. A/1127, at 170 (1949).
169. G.A. Res. 785, 8 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 41, U.N. Doec. A/2630 (1953).
170. Advisory Opinion on Effects of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Na-
tions Administrative Tribunal, [1954] I.CJ. 47, 53.
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and which provides for the competence of the Tribunal." 171 The inten-
tion that the I.L.O. Administrative Tribunal replace arbitral tribunals
in contracts with outside parties was never implemented. Some 1Os do
not have administrative tribunals. Staff claims against such organiza-
tions are judged by and appealed to higher-ranking members of those
organizations.
Conclusion: Principles of Law and Guiding Policies
This cursory review of decisional trends indicates that the growth in
the number of international claims has not been matched by a compa-
rable development in theory or in the articulation of general policies to
guide decision. The lag should be a cause for concern. Increases in 10
activity can only lead to more claim-related problems. The absence of
an appropriate theory may lead to uncoordinated decisions and an in-
consistent body of case law. Fortunately, international and compara-
tive jurisprudence does provide a rich body of principles and policies
that could be adapted to the legal issues raised in claims involving IOs.
A. Principles of Remedy and Organizational Efficiency
A corollary of the principle of responsibility is the principle of rem-
edy. The point, which would appear to be self-evident, often is over-
looked, in large part because of enforcement problems. Remedies may
take the form of monetary awards for compensation, punitive damages,
or special awards. Analogies from private law to the public sector must
be drawn with caution. There are significant differences in both scale
and public policy when one moves from States or individuals to 10
defendants. Furthermore, the principle of organizational efficiency dic-
tates that the appropriate responsibilities and remedies for IOs should
not disturb their efficient functioning. This is not a blanket exonera-
tion, nor a minimization of responsibility for unlawful behavior. It fol-
lows from the role of IOs as representatives of the shared interests of
the larger community and from the tendency of IOs to operate in unu-
sual circumstances where appropriate norms may not be clear.
B. Principle of Due Process
The discharge of the above principles must be accomplished with
appropriate procedures. We call this the principle of "due process," a
term drawn from national legal systems and expressed in many
equivalent situations as "general principles of law." It requires analo-
171. I.L.O. STAT. art. II, § 4.
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gous meaning in international jurisprudence. A fundamental set of
principles for the protection of human rights is provided in the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights.172 The.General Assembly and many
U.N.-affiliated organizations have adopted recommendations to pro-
mote the Declaration, and much of its content has been embodied in
multilateral agreements. 73 It is hardly'radical to contend that the
U.N., through which the Declaration came about, must, in its own ac-
tivities and procedures, comply with these principles to the greatest
possible extent.
Article 10 of the Declaration provides that every person is entitled to
a hearing by a tribunal in the determination of his rights and obliga-
tions.174 Similarly, Section 29 of the Convention on Privileges and Im-
munities provides that the U.N. "shall make provisions for appropriate
modes of settlement."'175 The most appropriate mode of settlement for
the U.N. is arbitration if claims cannot be settled through negotiation.
In most cases, this policy has been followed by the U.N.
Claims commissions would be appropriate for a quick and fair settle-
ment of claims arising out of special operations such as peace-keeping.
They are not handicapped by complex and lengthy legal procedures,
and'the predominant principles are common sense and fairness. Un-
fortunately, such commissions were not used for Congolese claims,
most of which remain unsettled. Prospectively, they would appear
preferable to other modes of dispute settlement for the planned U.N.
172. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/777, at 535 (1948). Promotion of the shared interests
of the larger community through IOs must never be jeopardized, but it would be quite ironic
to negate the rights of individuals on the assumption that they might be incompatible with
the functions of IOs.
173. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Optional Proto-
col, G.A. Res. 2200(A), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); Inter-
national Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, openedfor
signature, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; Convention on Prevention and Pdnishment of
Crime of Genocide, adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; International Convention on
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, G.A. Res. 3068, 28 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 30) 75, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973); Supplementary Convention on Abolition of
Slavery, done Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T. 3201, T.I.A.S. No. 6418, 266 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention
on Nationality of Married Women, done Feb. 20, 1957, 309 U.N.T.S. 67; Convention Relat-
ing to Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137; Protocol Relating to Status of
Refugees, done Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267; Conven-
tion on Political Rights of Women, done Mar. 31, 1951, 27 U.S.T. 1909, T.I.A.S. No. 8289,
193 U.N.T.S. 135; Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, adopted June
25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention against Discrimination in Education, adopted Dec.
14, 1960, 429 U.N.T.S. 93; Equal Remuneration Convention, adopted June 29, 1951, 165
U.N.T.S. 304; Abolition of Forced Labor Convention, adopted June 25, 1957, 320 U.N.T.S.
292.
174. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doe. A/777, at 535 (1948).
175. Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, supra note 69,
§ 29.
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operation in Namibia, which will involve at least one thousand civil-
ians and a peace-keeping force of several thousand troops.
C. International Defenses and the Principle of International Burden of
Proof
IOs should be able to plead certain defenses available to States. Cer-
tainly, in peace-keeping operations, U.N. forces could be attacked and
the actions necessary for self-defense might cause injuries. Hostilities
waged for collective enforcement of international law through the U.N.
cannot be strictly described as "war." Yet in the U.N. operation in the
Congo, the term "laws of war" frequently appeared to have been used
to justify not paying some damages. Whether or not "laws of war" was
correctly used, it is clear that the U.N. would claim, as a defense, a
right under the laws of war akin to that available to States. That de-
fense would require a demonstration that there was a reasonable pro-
portionality between the actions taken and the danger posed, and that
the injury claimed was proximately caused by the lawful act of self-
defense. 76 The U.N. would have to provide evidence as to the grave
necessity of its actions if it hoped to deny liability. The burden of proof
would be on the organization. This allocation of burden of proof as to
liability is generally appropriate in disputes between private parties and
IOs with extensive immunities because the organizations may refuse to
waive their immunities and may have unilateral competence to make
final judgments about their own liability, although pre-existing and
generally accepted rules for examining their behavior may be unclear.
176. The Hague Convention of 1907 and the Geneva Convention on Protection of Civil-
ian Persons in Time of War, with its additional protocols of June, 1977, deal with interfer-
ence with property rights and compensation during war. The Hague Convention provides
that a belligerent party which violates the regulations annexed to the convention shall, if the
case demands, be liable to pay compensation and shall be responsible for all acts committed
by persons forming part of its armed forces. Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of
Disputes, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 3, 36 Stat. 2199, T.S. No. 536. The convention outlaws action
"to destroy or seize the enemy's property unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively
demanded by the necessities of war." Id., art. 23.
Article 33 of the Geneva Convention on Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
prohibits pillage and "reprisals against protected persons and their property," and article 53
provides: "Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging
individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other public authorities,
or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such destruction is
rendered absolutely necessary by military operations." Convention on Protection of Civil-
ian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 33, 53, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75
U.N.T.S. 287.
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